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Abstract 
 
Portugal was one of the most affected countries by the sovereign debt crisis, whose 
impact was felt mostly in the peripheral European countries, being one of the reasons for 
the development of this topic. We have focused on only one industry, being the real estate 
and construction related firms, because there are few studies that make an exhaustive analysis 
of a single industry. Additionally, this industry in particular, is very pro-cyclical, in the sense 
that it depends a lot on the existence of good economic conditions to gather construction 
contracts as well as public investment.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to understand if the sovereign debt crisis had an 
impact over the capital structure of the companies and on the firm-specific variables. There 
are some theories that try to explain how companies decide about their capital structure that 
alongside with the support of empirical studies were used in the formulation of several 
hypotheses. 
An unbalanced panel of 404 firms, whose information was gathered from the 
database SABI Bureau Van Dijk, was used in the econometric estimations. We have 
estimated two main models for four different dependent variables, namely debt ratios, to 
assess if the results were the same for long-term and short-term debt. 
In the end, we provide evidence of a reduction in the debt ratios during the period 
of crisis, which may be a sign that a credit shortage occurred, at least for this industry. This 
event could have been caused by the huge distress banks were experiencing as well as all the 
austerity measures implemented during those years, due to the bailout applied in Portugal by 
the TROIKA. However, the robustness tests demonstrated that this evidence was relatively 
weak. We also have found some interesting results relative to the determinants of the 
literature included in the models.  
 
JEL–Codes: C12; C33; G01; G30; G32. 
Key-words: Capital Structure, capital structure determinants, sovereign debt crisis, 
panel data.  
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Resumo 
 
Portugal foi um dos países mais afetados pela crise de dívida soberana, cujo o 
impacto foi maior para os países europeus periféricos, e esta foi uma das razões que me levou 
ao desenvolvimento deste tema. O nosso foco foi apenas numa indústria, nomeadamente 
imobiliário e empresas que atuam no mercado da construção, porque existe uma certa 
escassez de estudos exaustivos em relação a uma indústria em particular e por ser uma 
indústria pró-cíclica, no sentido em que está dependente da existência de boas condições 
económicas para garantir contractos de construção, bem como para obter investimentos 
públicos. 
O objetivo desta dissertação é compreender se a crise de dívida soberana teve, ou 
não, impacto na estrutura de capital das empresas e sobre os determinantes da estrutura de 
capital. Existem algumas teorias que tentam explicar como as empresas decidem a sua 
estrutura de capital e juntamente com outros estudos empíricos foram empregues na 
formulação de hipóteses. 
Utilizamos um painel não-balanceado de 404 empresas, cuja a informação foi retirada 
da base de dados SABI Bureau Van Dijk, nas estimações econométricas. Foram estimados 
dois modelos base principais para quatro variáveis dependentes diferentes, nomeadamente 
rácios de dívida, para avaliar se os resultados são os mesmos para dívida de curto e de longo 
prazo. 
No final a nossa evidência empírica mostra uma redução dos rácios da dívida, durante 
o período de crise, que pode ser um indício de que ocorreu uma diminuição da oferta de 
crédito, pelo menos para este setor. Este acontecimento pode ter sido causado pelas 
dificuldades que o setor bancário estava a atravessar, bem como pelas medidas de austeridade 
aplicadas a Portugal pela TROIKA. No entanto, os testes de robustez demonstraram que esta 
evidência era relativamente fraca. Os resultados relativos aos determinantes da estrutura de 
capital presentes na literatura e incluídos nos modelos também mostraram ser bastante 
interessantes.  
 
Códigos-JEL: C12; C33; G01; G30; G32. 
Palavras-chave: Estrutura de capital, determinantes da estrutura de capital, crise 
dívida soberana, dados em painel. 
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1. Introduction 
 
First of all, with this dissertation, we intend to assess whether or not the sovereign 
debt crisis affected the capital structure of the construction firms that operate in the 
Portuguese market. Moreover, it is also our intention to evaluate which firm-specific 
variables have explanatory power over the debt level of the companies. Then, we will analyze 
if the results are in accordance with the main studies and theories of capital structure and if 
the capital structure determinants were affected by the crisis. 
The interest over this topic primarily emerged because Portugal was one of the most 
affected European countries by this crisis, which ultimately led to its bailout by the so-called 
Troika (International Monetary Fund, European Commission and European Central Bank). 
For this reason, this study is different from the previous ones since it focuses on a particular 
industry that depends largely on favorable economic conditions to provide incentives and 
encourage investment in infrastructures. On the other hand, there are not as many studies 
focusing only in just one specific industry during economically unstable periods. 
 The construction industry is a pro-cyclical industry, consequently, it can be 
anticipated that the sovereign debt crisis affected the business of those firms and more 
specifically its capital structure. It is argued that the instability of the banking and financial 
system and budgetary restrictions on government spending may have led to some credit 
constraints, lower investment in public works, a decrease in the profitability of these firms 
and a low level of confidence by investors that may have strongly influenced the construction 
sector. 
 To accomplish these objectives, a sample of Portuguese unlisted firms from the 
construction sector between the period of 2003 and 2016 was gathered in SABI. In the end, 
we used a sample of 404 firms and estimated eight different econometric models using a 
panel data model, the fixed effects model.   
Concerning the models, we have used four different dependent variables, all of which 
are debt ratios (total debt over total assets, long-term-debt over total assets, short-term debt 
over total assets and short-term debt over long-term debt). Then, we estimated two models 
for each debt ratio, one only with the firm-specific variables and another with the same 
independent variables plus a temporal dummy variable and interactive variables, which were 
the interaction between the dummy and each firm-specific variable. The models comprise 
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six firm-specific variables (size, profitability, growth, volatility of earnings, liquidity and age) 
and one dummy variable that will take the value of 1 if an observation takes place during the 
sovereign debt crisis period (considered between the years of 2011 and 2014) or 0 otherwise.  
We have found that the sovereign debt crisis significantly affected the capital 
structure of the industry in focus, causing a reduction of the debt ratios (total debt and long-
term debt). This result was already expected since banks were under huge stress and facing 
several liquidity problems. However, these results demonstrated to be weak after the 
execution of the robustness tests. Moreover, we achieved interesting results related with the 
firm specific variables where we corroborated several hypothesis such has a positive relation 
between size, age and tangibility with the total debt ratio. Conversely, we found a significant 
negative relation between the profitability of the company and all the debt ratios. 
 The second section of this dissertation is divided in three main sub-sections. The 
first comprises the literature review of the most important authors that have developed the 
main theories of capital structure throughout the years. In the second subsection, we have 
formulated the hypotheses to be tested with the support of the related literature, and in the 
third subsection we present the main literature about the sovereign debt crisis and how it 
may have caused any effect in the firms’ capital structure.  
Afterwards, it is presented the methodology used on this dissertation in section 3, 
followed by an analysis of the sample including an examination over the debt ratios, namely 
how they evolved over the years of the sample in section 4. Thereafter, we make a detailed 
analysis over the results provided by the econometric estimations in section 5 that will be 
tested by the robustness tests performed in section 6. In the last section, we present the main 
conclusions of the dissertation. 
 
  
 
 
3 
2. Literature Review 
 
 The literature review presented in this section is divided into three main sections. 
Firstly, we describe the general theories and studies related with the capital structure of the 
firms. In the following, we include a section where we will formulate the hypotheses with 
the support of previous studies that used firm-specific variables. The final section analyses 
the impact that the crisis may have had on the capital structure of the real estate and 
construction related firms. 
  
2.1) The Main Theories of Capital Structure 
 
Unquestionably, the study conducted by Modigliani and Miller (1958) was the trigger 
that has revolutionized financial theory, and consequently the interest of academics regarding 
the capital structure decisions and their impact on firms’ valuation. Their model was 
developed under powerful assumptions that result in the formulation of two propositions. 
The first is that the value of a company is not affected by the capital structure’s decisions 
and the second, which is directly related with the homemade leverage assumption, states that 
as the level of leverage increases within the company the equity holders would require a 
higher return because of the greater risk they entail.  
The study, mentioned previously, encouraged other authors to further investigate 
these questions by relaxing some of the assumptions to reach more realistic conclusions and 
explanations, such as Baumol and Malkiel (1967), where the capital structure would be 
relevant in the presence of transaction costs or in the presence of bankruptcy costs (Bierman 
and Thomas,1972). Stiglitz (1988) also alerted for the importance of the M&M model in the 
sense that it encouraged researchers to investigate these issues particularly regarding four of 
the assumptions, which are the homemade leverage, no information asymmetry, non-
existence of taxes and the assumption where firms can be identified by “risk class”. 
One of the biggest concerns of researchers has been the role played by taxes. Since 
interest payments are tax deductible, the value of a company could increase with the 
substitution of debt relative to equity, however considering the bankruptcy costs that 
increase with leverage, this effect is offset. In this perspective, Modigliani and Miller (1963) 
were also forced to reformulate their first paper to take into account the influence of income 
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taxation on the value and cost of capital of the companies. Hence, many authors tried to 
develop models of an optimal capital structure under those circumstances. However, Miller 
(1977)  under that framework still argues in his model, that in equilibrium the value of the 
company is still independent of capital structure decisions. He demonstrated that the tax 
advantage at corporate level exactly offsets the tax disadvantage at personal level, considering 
the assumptions of his model. 
On the contrary, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980)  extended the previous model with 
the inclusion of non-debt corporate tax shields and as a result invalidated the irrelevancy 
theorem. Furthermore, they predict a negative relation between non-debt corporate tax 
shields and level of debt, where the optimal level of leverage depended only on the 
interactions between personal and corporate tax treatment. 
In a different kind of study, Ross (1977) develops a model explaining the capital 
structure, under perfect market assumptions, where he considers the role of the manager in 
the financing decisions of the company and the possession of inside information. Under 
those circumstances, if the company increases its amount of debt it signals information to 
the market, increasing market’s perception value of the firm. However, his model has been 
considered too simple and was not intertemporal and continuous in time. 
Indeed, the inclusion of debt related costs was one of the main reasons that led to 
the development of the trade-off theory, by researchers. Briefly, this theory argues about the 
existence of an optimal capital structure, balancing the benefits provided by debt tax 
advantages against the bankruptcy and financial distress costs. According to this theory, it is 
favorable for the company to increase its level of debt until the point where the marginal 
benefits are exactly counterbalanced by marginal costs. 
One of the first studies related with the development of this theory was Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973) paper, where they developed a single period valuation model. It 
incorporated the tax advantages provided by debt and bankruptcy penalties and computed 
different states leading to the optimum level of debt that maximized the market value of the 
company. Moreover, these authors showed that the total market value of the firm is not in 
general a concave function of the level of debt. 
Similarly, the study of Scott (1976) also contributed to the theory with the 
construction of a multi-period model where he assumed that besides the expected future 
earnings, the value of a company was also a function of the liquidation value of its assets. In 
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the end, he claimed that the optimum level of leverage was as an increasing function of the 
liquidation value of the assets, the corporate tax rate and the size of the company. 
 Alternatively, Kim (1978) argues that the concept of an optimal capital structure is 
valid only if the optimal level of debt is lower than the debt capacity of the company. He 
analyses this issue for companies subjected to stochastic bankruptcy costs and corporate 
income taxes, being the results achieved in a perfect capital market situation where the 
market value of the firm is a concave function of the level of debt. 
Bradley et al. (1984) have created a cross-sectional model that led them to argue that 
the optimal capital structure is influenced by the costs of financial distress, the variability of 
the firm value and the amount of non-debt tax shields. As they expected the volatility of the 
firm and the R&D investment exhibited a negative sign in their empirical evidence whereas 
the non-debt tax shields had a positive coefficient contradicting their own predictions and 
other studies like DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). Their results suggested that firms that have 
more tangible assets’ investments have higher levels of debt which in accordance to Scott 
(1977). Companies can borrow at lower interest rates if they secure their debt with tangible 
assets, hence they will have higher levels of leverage. Lastly, they have found evidence of 
intra-industries similarities and inter-industry differences in the firm’s debt ratios.  
Along the years an alternative explanation came along, the pecking order theory. In 
contrast to the previous, this theory does not imply the existence of an optimal capital 
structure and it considers that the financing decisions are related with the adverse selection 
problem and information costs. In essence, it states that the financing of a company is made 
in a hierarchical way: first, firms use the cash flow generated by the operations of the 
company, i.e. internal financing, and if this is not enough they would recur to debt and lastly, 
issuance of shares, i.e. external financing. As firms climb the financing hierarchy, the higher 
will be the asymmetric information related costs. 
The first study that referred about the preference for internal financing by firms, was 
made by Donaldson (1961) (apud Long and Malitz, 1985). Nevertheless, the first to use this 
nomenclature was Myers (1984) in a very interesting study that provided curious insights 
about financing decisions. He begins by arguing that the capital structure cannot be explained 
by a single theory, although he believes pecking order theory is consistent with the empirical 
evidence. On his opinion, firms will only issue equity when the managers feel their company 
is overvalued, otherwise they will issue debt once internal financing is not sufficient. 
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However, if investors know about this, they will refuse to buy firms’ stock unless they know 
that the firm have used up all its debt capacity. 
 Myers and Majluf (1984) developed a model incorporating information asymmetry. 
They demonstrated in the model a preference for self-financing and that companies prefer 
debt to equity even if that means the abandon of some investment opportunities. If the firms 
need to invest and the stock price is too undervalued, they prefer to forego the investment 
instead of incurring in a loss to existing shareholders. They affirm it is better to issue safe 
securities than risky ones. In addition, if managers have superior information in the case of 
stock issuance the stock price will fall, and under the same conditions if they issue debt the 
price will not fall.  
 Fama and French (2002) found some evidence supporting the pecking order theory, 
namely a negative relation between profitability and leverage, as Frank and Goyal (2003) did. 
They also found a negative relation between R&D investment and level of debt as predicted 
by trade-off theory. Likewise, Long and Malitz (1985) empirical evidence also has shown a 
significant negative relationship between R&D investment and level of debt and a significant 
positive relationship between capital expenditure and debt. Furthermore, their evidence 
pointed to the existence of a moral hazard problem. 
 According with Frank and Goyal (2003) smaller high-growth firms should suffer 
from more information asymmetries, therefore their financing should follow the pecking 
order theory hierarchy, although their evidence did not reflect that. They also found that 
external finance is greatly used, where debt financing does not dominate equity finance in 
magnitude, suggesting that internal financing is not sufficient for firms’ investment. 
 The agency theory, mainly developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), also provided 
a great contribution for the explanation of financing decisions by firms, although the 
development of this theory has not been centered on the capital structure issues. It is very 
difficult to maintain an alignment between the interests of shareholder and managers, since 
they are both two individual agents and each have their own self-interests. For this reason, 
the main worries are that the managers tend to waste the free cash flow of the company in 
perquisites or unprofitable investments, resisting paying out to investors. This argument was 
advanced by Jensen (1986) in his free cash flow hypothesis. 
Therefore, this theory encourages profitable firms, with agency problems, to engage 
in more debt to discipline the management, so that they are constrained not to waste free 
cash flow and at the same time to provide payouts to investors, in this case debtholders. 
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 Jensen and Meckling (1976) believed that in addition to positive bankruptcy costs, 
taxes, and tax advantages on the payment of interests, the existence of agency costs 
contributes to the rejection of the irrelevance theorem advanced by M&M. Furthermore, 
they point out at the existence of agency costs between shareholders and bondholders. Some 
investments or projects have to be withdrawn due to previous financing decisions that had 
led to imposition of covenants (e.g. limit the acquisition of other companies). These 
covenants limit some of the decisions of the companies, which lead to agency costs. In 
addition, there are monitoring and bonding costs supported by the company as well as 
bankruptcy and reorganization costs. This problem may arise because there is the possibility 
of expropriation of value of debtholders by the shareholders (e.g. by engaging in very risky 
investments at the expense of creditors) or expand their wealth with the increase of dividends 
(Niu, 2008). 
 Concerning the agency problems for SMEs, Mac an Bhaird and Lucey (2010) state 
that these problems occur mainly between insider and outsider’s contributors of capital being 
significant particularly at the start-up stage when there is higher informational asymmetry 
and where it is more costly for this smaller firms to solve this problems with the debt 
providers. 
 
2.2) Determinants of Capital Structure 
 
Along this literature reviews’ subsection, we will document the determinants that 
were used in previous literature, as well as some studies of capital structure in periods of 
crisis so that we can develop predictions and formulate the hypotheses.  
However, there are some studies like the one made by Lemmon et al., 2015 that argue 
against the explanatory power of these type of determinants. They report that firm’s capital 
structure tends to converge and is stable through time, suggesting that the debt ratios are 
explained by a transitory and permanent component and that the usual firm-specific 
determinants models are not well specified because firm’s management is more apprehensive 
with long-term variations of the determinants than short-term variations. Antoniou et al. 
(2008) provided a study about the differences on the determinants of the capital structure 
between firms in countries that perform their activities in market-oriented economies and 
bank oriented economies. They found that the leverage ratio is also affected by the market 
conditions, concluding that the determinants are affected by the country’s legal and financial 
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traditions. Additionally, Faccio and Xu (2015) argue that both corporate and personal income 
are significant determinants in the explanation of the capital structure. 
Most of the predictions will rely on the main capital structure theories. “It appears 
that both the tradeoff and pecking order theories are at work in real life. The economic 
factors that drive the theories – taxes, costs of financial distress and information asymmetries 
– clearly are important.” (Myers, 2002) 
 
2.2.1) Tangibility 
 
This variable is, certainly, one of the most reported ones in the literature that is 
suggested to affect financing decisions of companies. Overall, the rationale of the trade-off 
theory is to measure the benefits of debt against the costs. Therefore, a firm has more 
capacity to borrow capital if its structure is composed with a higher ponderation of safer 
tangible assets than if it is composed with more risky assets (Myers, 2001). 
If a large part of the company’s investment is on tangible assets it has the possibility 
to engage in higher levels of debt (Long and Malitz, 1985). Considering the asymmetric 
information issues, the tangibility of the firm’s assets is important to reduce the costs of 
issuing securities, being secured debt more advantageous for the company (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). In addition, the shareholders of the companies may invest sub optimally expropriating 
the wealth of the creditors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977) and in this sense, 
tangible assets can be used as collateral. In addition, in case of liquidation this type of assets 
retain more value. (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Gaud et al., 2005). 
Considering most empirical studies and theories, we state the first hypothesis as: 
H1: The relation between tangibility and the debt ratio is expected to be positive. 
Some authors debate that the maturity of debt is linked to the maturity of the assets, 
hence long-term debt will be secured with long-term assets and short-term debt secured with 
short-term assets (Hall et al., 2000). Considering that, tangible assets are long-term 
investments a negative relation is expected between short-term debt and tangible assets 
(Palacín-Sánchez et al., 2013; Proença et al., 2014). 
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Taking into account these differences in maturity, we postulate our first hypothesis 
divided in two: 
H1a: The relation between tangibility and long-term debt ratio is expected to be 
positive. 
H1b: The relation between tangibility and short-term debt ratio is expected to be 
negative. 
 
2.2.2) Size 
 
The variable size was also largely included in empirical models related with capital 
structure. For example Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) advance 
that bigger companies have the tendency to be more diversified, thus they have a lower 
probability of bankruptcy. This is also stated by the tradeoff theory that predicts that firm 
size positively affects the levels of debt. 
The bigger the company is, the more will also potentially be the separation between 
managers and shareholders, therefore higher agency costs are expected (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Since this type of companies have a more stable stream of cash flow the 
manager may have an incentive to engage in investments that provide lower returns than the 
cost of capital returns or consume it with perquisites. One way presented by (Jensen, 1986) 
to discipline managers decisions is to increase the leverage of the company. 
Additionally, the agency costs of debt are lower for large size companies and require 
more debt to take full advantage from the tax shield provided by debt. Therefore, all the 
previous argumentation leads us to expect that larger firms engage in higher debt levels. 
H2: The relation between size and the debt ratio is expected to be positive.  
On the other hand, smaller firms may be charged with high debt costs because of 
their higher risk and higher asymmetric information problems that they entail (Palacín-
Sánchez et al., 2013). They also argue that when firms grow in size they tend to substitute 
short-term debt with long-term debt. In addition, the costs of issuing long-term debt may be 
higher for smaller firms (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Thus, all the previous statements point 
out for a possible preference of small firms to borrow on a short-term rather than on a long-
term basis. 
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All things considered, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H2a: The relation between firm size and long-term debt ratio is expected to be 
positive.  
H2b: The relation between firm size and short-term debt ratio is expected to be 
negative. 
2.2.3) Profitability 
 
One of most ambiguous determinants used on the models is the profitability of firms 
because the tradeoff theory, agency theory and pecking order theory predict different signs 
for the relation with the level of leverage. Although notwithstanding, it is a variable of great 
importance, as it can be seen in Wald (1999) who showed in his study that profitability was 
the only largest determinant of debt in his cross-sectional model for several countries. 
The pecking order theory presented by Myers (1984) states that the companies have 
a preference to finance themselves internally, and if it is insufficient then they will issue debt 
and then equity. The higher we climb in the hierarchy of financing the higher will be the 
asymmetric information costs. Thus, this theory predicts that more profitable firms will have 
lower debt levels. 
Ozkan (2001) agrees with the previous theory and argues that highly profitable firms 
with slow growth will have a lower ratio of debt comparing with the industry average and 
that unprofitable firms will have higher debt ratios. 
The tradeoff theory predicts a different relation since debt provides tax advantages 
on the payment of interests, so if firms are profitable it means that they have more taxable 
income to shield and have more capacity to service debt without staying at the risk of 
financial distress (Myers, 2001). Regarding this theory, Antão and Bonfim (2008) state that 
as profitability increases the bankruptcy costs decrease, leading companies to engage in 
higher debt levels. 
Harris and Raviv (1991) state based on asymmetric information models that their 
main empirical result is the positive relation between debt and profitability. The agency 
theory also states that a way to align the interests of shareholders and managers is to issue 
debt, particularly when the firms have high levels of free cash flow  (Jensen, 1986).  
In spite of the theories predicting different outcomes, we expect a negative relation 
between profitability and debt because it is the result most often found in the empirical 
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evidence of many studies (e.g. Harris and Raviv, 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; de Jong et 
al., 2008). Plus, Talberg et al. (2008)  in a study of the capital structure on different industries 
found a high and significant negative relation between profitability and debt for the 
construction industry. They state: “…it would suggest that the construction industry will use 
very little debt in their financing when they have profitable years and instead use their profits 
to build up an equity buffer.” 
H3: The relation between profitability and the debt ratio is expected to be negative. 
 
2.2.4) Growth 
 
Myers (1977) predicts a negative relation between growth opportunities and level of 
debt. In addition, unobservable growth opportunities reduce the effectiveness of bond 
covenants which limits the amount of risky debt supported by the company (Long and 
Malitz, 1985). Moreover, high growth firms whose value comes from intangibles, prefer not 
to rely on debt financing because of the uncertain availability of income to service the debt 
(Deesomsak et al., 2004). 
In this case, the agency costs related with debt may also be higher because there is a 
higher probability of expropriation of value as a result of risky investments (Deesomsak et 
al., 2004). Hence, it is expected a negative relation between long-term debt and growth, but 
this agency costs could be mitigated if the companies issue short-term debt instead of long-
term debt (Myers, 1977).  
Taking into account the agency costs between shareholders and managers, companies 
that have more growth opportunities will have less cash flow available for expenditures in 
perquisites so in that sense debt will be less needed for disciplinary reasons. It is expected that 
firms with good investment opportunities will have lower debt levels comparing to those mature, 
slow growth firms (Jensen, 1986). 
However, the pecking order theory predicts that companies with more opportunities, 
for the same level of profitability, should increase their leverage (Frank and Goyal, 2009). The 
internal funds generated by a growing company may be insufficient so they will need to be 
financed with debt. Gaud et al. (2005) states that growth firms with financing needs will issue 
short-term debt. Despite all these arguments, previous studies are not conclusive about the 
expected relation over this firm-specific determinant (Palacín-Sánchez et al., 2013). 
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Thus, we expect the following relation: 
H4: The relation between growth and the debt ratio is expected to be negative. 
2.2.5) Volatility of Earnings 
 
 The simulation performed by Bradley et al. (1984) showed that firm leverage ratios have 
a negative relation with the volatility of the earnings in the presence of distress costs as they 
observed in their empirical evidence. The probability of financial distress increases with the 
volatility as well as a decrease in debt capacity of the earnings of the firm because it can make 
more difficult the fulfilment of the debt service  (Michaelas et al., 1999; Deesomsak et al., 2004).  
According with Antão and Bonfim (2008), higher volatility leads to higher bankruptcy costs. 
 Therefore, we present the following hypothesis: 
 H5: The relation between volatility of earnings and the debt ratio is expected to be 
negative. 
2.2.6) Liquidity 
 
There are not as many authors using this variable to formulate a research hypothesis. 
However, under the pecking order theory if a firm has more liquidity, in theory, it will have 
a higher capacity to finance itself with the generated internal funds, hence it predicts that 
more liquid firms will borrow less. Plus, Deesomsak et al. (2004) advance that the 
management can manipulate liquid assets favoring the shareholders against the interests of 
debtholders, resulting in higher agency costs of debt. 
 Although notwithstanding, firms with higher liquidity can also support more debt 
because they have greater capacity to meet the short-term obligations when they fall due 
(Ozkan, 2001). This argument provides a different prediction. On the other hand, if firms 
do not have liquidity, it means that they have less ability to meet short-term obligations, so 
they would need to borrow on short-term basis.  
 The empirical evidence also suggests a significant negative relation between liquidity 
and debt (Ozkan, 2001; Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto, 2004; Akdal, 2012)  
 According with these studies we formulate that: 
 H6: The relation between liquidity and the debt ratio is expected to be negative. 
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2.2.7) Age 
 
 The empirical evidence found by Talberg et al. (2008) shows that the coefficient 
related with age has a negative sign for construction sector firms and for the other industries 
they analyzed, therefore contributing to the idea that older firms borrow less.  
 The previous evidence makes sense under the pecking order theory because older 
firms have higher ability to generate internal funds, thus the need to incur in borrowings is 
lower than for an younger firm that may have insufficient profitability in the first years to 
face up the financing needs (Michaelas et al., 1999; Palacín-Sánchez et al. 2013). Their 
empirical evidence also reflects the predictions of Hall et al. (2000) who also found a negative 
relation. 
 Considering the previous studies, we postulate the following: 
 H7: The relation between age and the debt ratio is expected to be negative. 
2.3) Sovereign Debt Crisis 
 
Antão and Bonfim (2008) state that until 2007 the dependence of non-financial firms 
from bank financing was very high. They have shown, in relation to Portuguese firms, an 
increase in indebtedness ratios during the previous decade, which almost doubled between 
1995 and 2007, being one of the largest across the European countries. This increase in debt 
could have led to some corrections in the capital structure, during the years of crisis. 
 To figure out if the sovereign debt crisis and consequently the bailout applied to 
Portugal might have had a structural effect on the capital structure of the firms we will 
introduce a dummy variable and some interactive variables. On the following, we will present 
some literature related with those issues. 
 In mid-2007, the global financial crisis began to manifest itself in US and then it 
spread out to the rest of the world after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 that 
caused a huge turmoil in the financial markets. It was found that some of the causes were 
related with the lack of regulation regarding high risk securities, high levels of leverage and 
high-risk mortgage-loans allied with the real estate prices bubble.  
 Thereafter, the global financial crisis slowly became in 2009, the sovereign debt crisis 
in Europe when Greece Prime-Minister announced that the country was struggling against 
severe fiscal problems and presented a revised budget deficit that was the double of the 
previously estimated one, causing an alert signal in Europe causing an abrupt rise in sovereign 
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spreads (De Santis, 2014). Varoufakis et al. (2013) argument that this crisis can be unfolded 
in four interrelated domains namely: a banking crisis, a debt crisis, an investment crisis and 
a social crisis 
Portugal was one of the most affected countries by this crisis due to the aggravating 
effect caused by its balance-of-trade deficit (Neri, 2010). Consequently, this environment led 
to international assistance carried out by the so-called Troika (European Commission, 
International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank) in May 2011, where “the presence 
of an asymmetric shock was noticed, with the periphery and the center of the European 
Union being targeted with different magnitudes.”(Alves and Francisco, 2013).  In the end, 
Portugal received a €78 billion financial assistance package and in return was obliged to 
implement a wide range of sectorial reforms and to be subject to regular evaluations. During 
the program the level of unemployment reached all-time records reflecting the high 
instability of the Portuguese economy  (Gorjão, 2012).  
Banks, at this time of crisis, were under serious liquidity problems and suffering 
pressure to rebuild their capital bases, which led to the deterioration of the euro area banking 
system and a flow of credit to the private sector (Allen and Moessner, 2012). The lack of 
common European policy in the resolution of the banking crisis led to the rescue of several 
troubled banks by governments (De Bruyckere et al., 2013). Iyer et al. (2014) also studied this 
subject for the 2007-2009 crisis in Portugal and found that banks more dependent on 
interbank borrowing before the crisis decreased the supply of credit during crisis, being the 
smaller and those with weak banking relationship firms, the most affected ones by this credit 
shortage. 
In short, the banking sector acts as an intermediary, by channeling money from 
lenders to households and firms to support the investments needed for their operations, and 
in some countries the governments rely on the banking sector for private funding. By their 
turn, the states promote economic growth and stability to promote good bank performance 
(Kanda and Iqbal, 2014). Additionally, sovereign debt was an important collateral that banks 
used prior the crisis, and the decrease in the value of this asset brought problems to the 
financing of banks. This may be translated into higher constraints for banks to lend money 
to other non-financial firms, like real estate and construction firms.   
 During crises, firms find it harder to borrow since there is a reduction in credit supply 
and on the demand side firms may need more debt because of less internal funds generated 
(Zeitun et al., 2016). In addition, lenders may stop rolling-over short-term debt (Demirguc-
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Kunt et al., 2015) and the composition of the maturity of debt can be important for the 
outcomes on the corporate behavior of the firm when it occurs shocks in credit and liquidity 
(Custódio et al. , 2013). However, the empirical evidence of (Fosberg, 2012) has shown a 
significant increase in firms debt ratios in the US, contrarily to what was expected due to the 
reduction of credit supply and banking distress, during the global financial crisis.  
In countries that were severely affected by the crisis, there is less credit channeled to 
non-financial firms and this could lead firms to a financially constrained situation, therefore 
these firms could experience credit rationing and higher costs for borrowing and ultimately 
forego profitable investment opportunities (Harrison and Widjaja, 2014). Arteta and Hale 
(2008) even found significant statistical evidence of a decline in foreign credit to domestic 
private firms. All these constraints could have led to changes in the way firms decide about 
their financing in periods of crisis and recessions, and periods of growth. 
Using an European dataset during financial crisis Campello et al. (2012) have shown 
that firms with restricted access to credit like small and private firms use more financing 
from credit lines than large and public firms. Their evidence suggests that credit lines are not 
constrained by banks to the firms during these economic unstable environments, providing 
some liquidity to the firms.    
This credit supply shock caused by the sovereign debt crisis led to significant distress 
in the banking sector in most of the peripheral countries. As a result, the cost of loans 
increased for non-financial firms and households since 2010 (Neri, 2010), being this one of 
the main reasons for my expectation of capital structure changes in Portuguese construction 
companies. Similarly, Albertazzi et al. (2014) refers conditionings for Italian banks to provide 
credit on firms and households. The article written by Lane (2012) stated that in countries 
like Spain and Ireland the construction sector was one that suffered the most from the 
“cessation of credit boom”, and that this decline was a profound shock for the economy of 
both countries.  
Even so, Kahle and Stulz (2013) argue that firms have other channels to finance 
themselves besides bank loans, such as the use of cash holdings, issue public debt, selling 
assets or obtain more trade credit, and that way the impact of a shock on credit would be 
lower. Casey and O’Toole (2014) also tested the use of alternative financing but for European 
SMEs with bank lending constraints, and found that those are more likely to use financing 
like trade credit, informal lending and loans from other companies. SMEs are more 
dependent on bank financing when they have higher needs for external finance, although, 
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this means higher asymmetric information costs for banks, hence higher risk which may 
induce banks to reduce loan maturity and increase interest rate (Hernandez-Canovas and 
Koeter-Kant, 2008). The authors suggest this can encourage SMEs to create closer relations 
with banks to optimize loan conditions. 
The research made particularly for Portugal about bank restrictions reflect what has 
been documented previously. For instance, Antunes and Martinho (2012) state that 
Portuguese banks lost access to debt markets, plus they suggest the existence of constraints 
in credit for businesses that could be the result of the increase in bank financing costs. Lastly, 
they report a decrease for loans, especially for first time loans. Farinha and Félix (2014) 
produced a report analyzing only Portuguese SMEs and their results suggest a positive 
relation, on credit supply side, for collateral and negative for the leverage of the company. 
On the credit demand side, they found a positive relation for short-term needs and negative 
on interest rates. Their estimation showed credit constraints for these companies, even 
though they had a positive credit demand.  
Meanwhile, several studies were done with the purpose of finding if changes 
occurred in the capital structure of firms caused by periods of crisis. “Any recession would 
be expected to cause changes in firm profitability and other capital structure determinants 
and, therefore, cause a change in firm capital structure.”(Fosberg, 2012). 
  Akbar et al. (2013) performed a study on private UK firms regarding how the shock 
on credit supply, like the financial global crisis, affects the capital structure of the firms. The 
authors concluded that there was a significant negative impact caused by the crisis on the 
leverage ratio of the firms, being stronger on the short-term ratio.  Then, they suggest that 
the supply of credit is an important factor for the capital structure of firms, meaning that 
when credit supply shocks happen, there is a contraction of the external financing activities. 
However, the evidence found for long-term financing is insignificant, which could mean that 
this financing channel is not influenced by the financial shocks. 
 Also, Iqbal and Kume (2013) studied the impact of the financial crisis in UK, 
Germany and France. An interesting perspective of their study is the fact that the UK 
economy is more market based (like in the US) while the German and French economies are 
more bank based, so it is possible to achieve different types of conclusions. They found that 
firms from Germany and UK increased their leverage ratios during the crisis period and 
registered a decrease on post-crisis period. Nevertheless, the authors found no significant 
relation for French firms. In addition, they found that firms with debt ratios lower (higher) 
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than the average industry, in pre-crisis period, have a progressive increase (decrease) in their 
leverage in both the crisis and post-crisis periods. 
Proença et al. (2014) report a decreasing trend for leverage ratios of Portuguese 
SMEs after the 2008 financial crisis, although “due to the limitation in the longevity of the 
sample, the impact of the financial crisis was not evident enough as was expected.” Greece 
also went through economic and social difficulties caused by sovereign debt crisis and Balios 
et al. (2016) performed a study on the SMEs of that country but strangely did not found any 
evidence of changes in the determinants as a result of the crisis, similar to Proença et al. 
(2014). 
 On the other hand, Brendea (2013) found an increase in the leverage levels of 
Romanian Listed firms after the crisis. The coefficient of the dummy variable was significant 
suggesting that the crisis influences the capital structure of the firms. Similar evidence was 
found for Croatian firms (Mostarac and Petrovic, 2013). Zeitun et al. (2016) developed a 
study on firms from Gulf Cooperation Council countries to see if those also suffered an 
impact in its capital structure caused by crisis. Their results reflected a negative and significant 
impact of the crisis on the leverage ratios due to the shortage of credit supply. 
Harrison and Widjaja (2014) study is particularly interesting in the sense that they 
found changes in the determinants of capital structure after the crisis. Profitability lost some 
of its economic relevance in the model, and on the other hand, the tangibility increased its 
influence during crisis periods. The lower profitability of firms during crisis periods could be 
one of the explanations for the loss in explanatory power because it will be difficult for the 
firm to use the internal generated funds to finance its investments. The authors suggest that 
for lenders to account for the increase of adverse selection during financial crisis they give 
higher emphasis to higher values of tangible assets. 
Even though we are focusing on studies from more recent crises Deesomsak, 
Paudyal and Pescetto (2004) made a study focused on the 1997 Asian financial crisis, that 
produced interesting conclusions in the way determinants of capital structure change in 
response of crisis periods. First, the evidence points out to changes in capital structure 
decisions caused by crisis. The size of the firm variable was insignificant in pre-crisis period 
and became significant after the crisis, which could mean that lenders could have preference 
for larger firms when trying to reduce default risk. They also found changes between pre-
crisis and post-crisis period in other variables like liquidity and growth opportunities. 
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It is expected that during periods of economic turmoil there is an increase in the 
volatility of the earnings that for one side will decrease the tax advantage of debt and on the 
other will increase the business risk (Mostarac and Petrovic, 2013), thus capital structure 
decisions could be affected. 
Since our study encompasses only private unlisted companies, and Portuguese firms 
have heavier reliance on bank financing than on financial markets, it is expected that the 
difficulties imposed by the crisis on banks would cause an impact on the way companies 
finance themselves. We also expect that the bailout and subsequent period of austerity, to 
cause a significant impact on the capital structure determinants of the Portuguese real estate 
and construction firms, since this type of companies rely a lot on the existence of public 
works and financing. We can consider this as being a very pro-cyclical industry and during 
crisis the ability of the government to invest in public works was damaged because one of 
Portugal´s main problems were to finance its public debt (Éltető, 2011) and rebalance public 
finances (Sgherri and Zoli, 2011). Also, “… in February 2012, the amount of credit given by 
banks to companies reached a new historical low” (Gorjão, 2012), hence all the conjectures 
point to changes and adaptations that companies in Portugal were forced to do regarding 
financing decisions. 
According with the empirical evidence of previous studies, we expect a decrease on 
the leverage of Portuguese construction firms, due to the shortage on credit supply, caused 
by the sovereign debt crisis, that constrained the ability of banks to finance themselves and 
consequently the existence of constraints on the way firms finance themselves. However, a 
different result would not be a surprise since firms will have a lower capacity to finance 
themselves due to lower profitability and liquidity. Therefore, it is expected an increase in 
short-term-debt during crisis (Farinha and Félix, 2014). Likewise, Michaelas et al. (1999) 
found evidence of an increase of short-term debt in SME’s capital structure during periods 
of crisis, and on the other hand the long-term debt ratios have a positive relationship with 
changes in economic growth, so that means lower long-term debt levels during a crisis. 
However, the more firms use short-term debt the more they are exposed to credit supply 
shocks  since it implicates more frequent renegotiations (Custódio et al. , 2013). 
Our hypotheses are then stated as follows: 
H8: It is expected a decrease in the debt ratio caused by the crisis. 
H9: It is expected an increase in the short-term debt ratio caused by the crisis. 
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 Regarding the firm specific variables, it is expected that during the crisis, higher 
tangibility to be associated with higher levels of debt (Harrison and Wisnu Widjaja, 2014), 
because banks will require greater guarantees to provide financing to firms and these assets 
can be used as collateral (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Farinha and Félix, 2014). Additionally, it 
reduces information costs to creditors (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
For similar reasons, we also expect the same relation between the size of the company 
and periods of recession because it is expected that these firms are more stable and safer for 
financial institutions to lend their money because they have lower default risk (Deesomsak 
et al. 2004). Mostarac and Petrovic (2013) empirical evidence demonstrates that the size of 
the firm has more explanatory power during the period of crisis than in the pre-crisis sub-
sample. 
  After all, our hypotheses can be formulated in the following manner: 
H10: It is expected a larger positive effect of tangibility on the debt ratio during the 
crisis.  
H11: It is expected a larger positive effect of the variable size on the debt ratio during 
the crisis.  
 We anticipate a reduction in the profits of the Portuguese construction firms during 
the crisis due to the lack of investment by the government and other investors, especially 
after the downgrading of the Portuguese debt rating. Therefore, during the crisis economic 
environment we expect that banks will lend to firms not based on their profitability at that 
time but on future prospects or other factors, therefore the profitability of the company will 
not exert any significant effect during the crisis. In this sense, we develop the last hypothesis, 
that is similar to the empirical evidence shown by Harrison and Widjaja (2014). Although we 
anticipate a significant negative relation overall, between profitability and the total debt ratio, 
we do not expect any significant marginal effect, caused by the crisis. 
H12: It is expected that the profitability will produce an insignificant marginal effect 
on the debt ratio, during the period of crisis. 
To measure the level of debt we will use four ratios, being, a short-term debt ratio 
(short-term debt over total assets), a long-term debt ratio (long-term debt over total assets) 
and a total debt ratio (total debt over total assets).  Lastly, we will also use a ratio to 
understand how the different determinants and the crisis affect the composition of debt that 
will be given by the ratio between the short-term and long-term debt, which we nominated 
as debt composition ratio. 
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Table 1 - Summary of the hypotheses formulated. 
Variable Hypotheses 
Tangibility 
H1: The relation between tangibility and the debt ratio is expected to be 
positive. 
H1a: The relation between tangibility and the long-term debt ratio is expected 
to be positive. 
H1b: The relation between tangibility and the short-term debt ratio is expected 
to be negative. 
Size 
H2: The relation between size and the debt ratio is expected to be positive. 
H2a: The relation between firm size and the long-term debt ratio is expected to 
be positive. 
H2b: The relation between firm size and the short-term debt ratio is expected 
to be negative. 
Profitability 
H3: The relation between profitability and debt ratio is expected to be 
negative. 
Growth 
H4: The relation between growth and the debt ratio is expected to be 
negative. 
Volatility of 
Earnings 
H5: The relation between volatility of earnings and the debt ratio is expected to 
be negative.  
Liquidity 
H6: The relation between liquidity and the debt ratio is expected to be negative. 
Age 
H7: The relation between age and the debt ratio is expected to be negative. 
Sovereign 
Debt Crisis 
H8: It is expected a decrease in the debt ratio caused by the crisis. 
H9: It is expected an increase in the short-term debt ratio caused by the crisis. 
H10: It is expected a larger positive effect of tangibility on the debt ratio during 
the crisis. 
H11: It is expected a larger positive effect of the variable size on the debt ratio 
during the crisis. 
H12: It is expected that the profitability will produce an insignificant marginal 
effect on the debt ratio, during the period of crisis. 
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3. Methodology 
 
In this section we will describe the methodology that will be used in this dissertation. 
To assess the impact of the firm-specific variables, and even more important, whether the 
sovereign debt crisis affected or not the capital structure of firms, we will estimate some 
econometric models for a sample of 404 Portuguese real estate and construction companies, 
from 2003 to 2016. We used two main models, that are described below by equations (1) and 
(2), where the first will be used to assess the impact of the capital structure determinants and 
the second will be used to assess the impact of the crisis in the debt ratios. 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 𝑓(𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ,
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)  
 
(1) 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 𝑓(𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ,
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠, 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠, 𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠,
𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠, 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠,
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠, 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 ∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠)  
 
(2) 
 
We will use four debt ratios to account for the differences in debt maturity, namely 
long-term debt ratio, short-term debt ratio, total debt ratio and debt composition ratio. The 
first main model will include six different firm-specific variables to test the hypotheses related 
with those variables and to understand how they affect the capital structure, as formulated 
in (3). The second model includes all the previous variables, but also incorporates one 
dummy variable accounting for the crisis period and interactive variables, as formulated in 
(4). The interactive variables are computed by multiplying the respective firm-specific 
variable and the dummy. We will estimate eight different models, two for each dependent 
variable, that will be based on the following equations. 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑐𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
𝑖 = 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠;     𝑡 = 2006, … , 2014 
(3) 
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 The dependent variables will be defined as the ratio between debt (short-term debt, 
long-term debt and total debt) and total assets, and the debt composition ratio will be given 
by the ratio of short-term debt over long-term debt. 
The variable GROWTH is defined by the growth rate of total assets. 
 The variable LAGE is given by the logarithm of the number of years that the firm 
has been operating. 
 The variable PROF is defined by the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes 
depreciation and amortization over total assets. 
 The variable TANG is measured by the ratio between fixed assets and total assets. 
 The variable VOL is given by the ratio between gross margin (the difference of sales 
and the costs of goods sold) and the EBIT, that is, the degree of operating leverage. 
 The variable SIZE is defined by the logarithm of total assets.  
 The variable LIQ is given by the ratio between current assets and current liabilities. 
 The variable crisis is a binary variable that takes the value of 0 if it corresponds to the 
period between 2003 to 2009 or 2015 to 2016 and takes the value of 1 if it corresponds to 
the period of 2011 to 2014. “By February 2010 the 2008 blast had reached Europe” 
(Varoufakis, Y. 2016). We could have considered the starting point of the crisis to be 2010 
as some authors referred, but in our opinion, this year was too noisy to isolate as much as 
possible the effects caused by the sovereign debt crisis only. In addition, we have chosen this 
period because Portugal was under the Economic Adjustment Programme, developed by 
TROIKA, during this time frame.  
 The model will use panel data, also known as longitudinal data. We can consider it 
as the combination of cross-section data and time-series data providing a set of observations 
with two dimensions, one observation for each individual over a time period. We considered 
the panel variable to be the name of the companies and the time variable to be the years of 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡
+  𝜆𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠+𝜆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺 ∗ 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖 + 𝜆𝐿𝐴𝐺𝐸 ∗ 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖 + 𝜆𝐿𝐼𝑄 ∗ 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖
+  𝜆𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 ∗ 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖 + 𝜆𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹 ∗ 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖 + 𝜆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 ∗ 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖
+ 𝜆𝑉𝑂𝐿 ∗ 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖 +  𝑐𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
𝑖 = 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠;     𝑡 = 2006, … , 2014 
(4) 
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the sample. In addition, the panel used is an unbalanced panel since some of the cross-
sectional units (firms) have some missing years in the sample. 
 According with Hsiao (2003), panel data provides some advantages comparing with 
the other types of data, like giving a higher amount of data with more detail, which helps to 
increase the degrees of freedom and reducing collinearity among the independent variables. 
Also, improves the efficiency of the econometric estimation. With the existence of multiple 
observations on the same firms, it is possible to control for some unobserved characteristics 
of firms, although panel data as well as time series should have special treatment due to the 
correlation across time (Wooldridge, 2012). We applied two methods of panel data 
estimation. The random effects model and fixed effects model. The general panel data model 
is given by the following equation: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝒙𝑖𝑡𝜷 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,                             𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 (5) 
 
 The i represents the firms and t represents the periods of time.  The explanatory 
variables observed are represented by 𝑥𝑖𝑡  and the parameter 𝑐𝑖  captures the unobserved 
heterogeneity and all the unobserved time constant factors that affect the dependent variable 
(Wooldridge, 2012). It is commonly known as unobserved effect. The parameter 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the 
random error, and captures the unobserved factors that change over time and that affect the 
dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2012). It is often called idiosyncratic error. 
 The main issue associated with these panel data models is related with the 
unobserved effect (𝑐𝑖 ), namely if it exists a correlation between this parameter and the 
explanatory variables. If we find a correlation between 𝑐𝑖  and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , i.e., 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑐𝑖) ≠
0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇  then 𝑐𝑖  is considered a fixed effect. Otherwise, if it is not found 
correlation between 𝑐𝑖  and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , i.e., 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑐𝑖) = 0𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇  then 𝑐𝑖  is 
considered an individual random effect. 
 In the end, to decide which model is more appropriate we employed a Hausman 
(1978) test to understand which of the models better suits the estimation where the null 
hypothesis was rejected. After performing the test, we concluded that the fixed effects model 
was still consistent, and the random effects model became inconsistent. Therefore, in the 
empirical results’ section we will only present the fixed effects models results. 
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Table 2 - Summary of the key variables. 
  
Variables Formulas 
DEBTR DEBTR =
TOTAL DEBT
TOTAL ASSETS
 
LTDR LTDR =
LONG − TERM DEBT
TOTAL ASSETS
 
STDR STDR =
SHORT − TERM DEBT
TOTAL ASSETS
 
DCR DCR =
SHORT − TERM DEBT
LONG − TERM DEBT
 
TANG TANG =
FIXED ASSETS
TOTAL ASSETS
 
SIZE SIZE = LN(TOTAL ASSETS) 
PROF PROF =
EBITDA
TOTAL ASSETS
 
GROWTH GROWTH = LN(FIXED ASSETST) − LN(FIXED ASSETST−1) 
VOL VOL =
GROSS MARGIN
EBIT
=
SALES − COST OF SALES
EBIT
 
LIQ LIQ =
CURRENT ASSETS
 CURRENT LIABILITIES 
 
LAGE LAGE = LN(YEAR −  YEAR OF FOUNDATION) 
CRISIS 
𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 = 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 2011 𝑎𝑛𝑑 2014 
𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 = 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 2003 − 2010 𝑎𝑛𝑑 2015 − 2016. 
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4. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 
We gathered the data from the database SABI Bureau van Dijk that contains 
information about a wide range of Portuguese and Spanish firms. The following criteria was 
used in order to select a proper sample for this dissertation. We selected only firms with the 
primary industry code 41 (Real Estate Promotion) and 43 (Specialized Construction 
Activities) from the CAE rev. 3 (the Portuguese Classification of Economic Activities), firms 
that are unlisted and based in Portugal, and lastly, firms that present at least 50 workers, for 
at least one of the years from the period between 2005 and 2016. 
Moreover, we made an individual research over each firm of the dataset to confirm 
if they really had operations related with the real estate or construction sector. Then, we only 
kept firms with at least eight years of observations, where part of the years must be during 
the crisis and other part must be during a non-crisis period. The observations where the 
value of fixed asset and sales was zero were removed from the sample. In the end, we 
obtained an unbalanced panel of 404 firms. 
Table 3 - Descriptive statistics. The variables are 𝑫𝑬𝑩𝑻𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = (Total Debt/Total Assets); 𝑳𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = 
(Long-Term Debt/Total Assets); 𝑺𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Short-Term Debt/Total Assets; 𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊,𝒕 = (Fixed Assets/Total 
Assets); 𝑳𝑰𝑸𝒊,𝒕= (Current Assets/Current Liabilities); 𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕= LN(Total Assets); 𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝒊,𝒕= (EBITDA/Total 
Assets); 𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯𝒊,𝒕= LN(Fixed Assets 𝒕) - (Fixed Assets 𝒕−𝟏); 𝑽𝑶𝑳𝒊,𝒕= (Gross Margin/EBIT). The variables TA 
(total assets), EBITDA, TD (total debt) and SALES are stated in € thousands. 
                                                 
1 These ratios are higher than one because total equity is negative, i.e., the level of debt is higher than 
the value of the assets. We have looked at each of these situations to assure that the equity value was negative. 
Those firms where the equity value was positive were excluded.   
 Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
DEBTR 4767 0.2655424 0.2261296 0.2294457 0 1.5952691 
LTDR 4767 0.1729957 0.1069893 0.2090484 0 1.5711011 
STDR 4767 0.0925466 0.042412 0.1282517 0 1.4700971 
TANG 4767 0.1612615 0.1184266 0.1525249 0.010981 0.9919481 
AGE 4734 19.72851 16   14.30849 0 86 
LIQ 4760 2.411235 1.463615 5.549143 0.05952 140.5399 
SIZE 4767 8.164284 8.187639   1.734264 3.270588 13.71592 
PROF 4314 0.0686974   .0612888 0.1214856 -1.347175 0.8266337 
GROWTH 4288 0.062972 .0318515 0.3129695 -2.747227 2.822285 
VOL 4130 22.51021 14.83028 87.50315 -1156.711 840.566 
TA 4767 18472.82 3596.223 65458.69 26.32681 905210 
EBITDA 4314 655.8898 201.2443   3608.815 -57351.29 56527.81 
TD 4767 6553.833 677.6302 27225.24 0 386785.8 
SALES 4638 11068.13 3210.38 32722.74 16.68 626544.5 
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 In addition, it is very important to highlight that most of the companies presented in 
this sample are SME’s. The table 2 provides some descriptive statistics, namely the number 
of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, the minimum and maximum value for 
each relevant variable. 
On average, the firms in the sample have a ratio of debt that is approximately 26.6% of the 
total assets, where 17.3% corresponds to long term-debt and 9.3% corresponds to short-
term debt. Therefore, we can conclude that the firms on the sample have higher amounts of 
long-term debt than short-term debt. This outcome was expected since long-term loans are 
usually made for larger amounts than short-term loans. Some firms have no debt in their 
capital structure while others are fully indebted. 
The firms in the sample have, on average, 16% tangible assets out of the total assets. 
Some firms have their asset structure almost completely constituted by tangible assets 
whereas others have almost any. 
 On the profitability side, we can observe that the mean is positive where the 
EBITDA represents approximately 7% of total assets. We can see that there are companies 
where the EBITDA represents more than 80% of total assets and others where the EBITDA 
is 130% lower than the value of total assets. The average value of the EBITDA is 
approximately 655.9€ thousand and we can observe that there is a substantial dispersion of 
the values in the sample. 
 We can see that 50% of the firms have at least 146.4% of current assets in relation 
to current liabilities, thus the firms on the sample present some liquidity, although there is a 
great dispersion of values. The firms in the sample also present, on average, a positive value 
for growth, where half of the sample grew at least 3.2%, in one-year period. 
 On average firms have 19.7 years being that the oldest firm has 86 years. The variable 
VOL is the variable in the model that presents more volatility and where the gross margin is 
approximately 22.5 times higher than the EBIT, on average. Half of the firms have at least 
677.6€ thousand in debt and the observation with the highest amount of debt presents a 
value of 386 785.8€ thousand. The biggest company, measured in total assets, has 905210€ 
thousands of total assets and the smaller has, approximately, 26.33€ thousands of total assets. 
The firms, on average, are constituted by 18 473€ thousand of total assets. 
 The variables LAGE, VOL and PROF have fewer observations than the others do 
because some of the companies did not have observations for all the years and the dataset 
had some flaws in the values relative to the costs of sales. This data is strictly necessary for 
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the computation of the gross margin, which is one of the inputs of the degree of operating 
leverage. 
 
4.1) Evolution of the Debt Ratios 
 
In figure 1, we can observe that firms were slightly increasing their levels of debt 
until 2010, coinciding with the early stages of the sovereign debt crisis, and could be a sign 
that firms had engaged in debt during and after the global financial crisis. Then, the ratio of 
total debt remained constant. Before 2010, the ratios of total debt were around 25%, but 
then these increased to levels around 29% and 30% for the rest of the years. It is interesting 
to notice that the ratio of long term-debt shows a slight positive trend along the years and it 
remained somewhat constant after the year of 2010, therefore, maybe it did not occur a 
shortage over this type of credit, even though this ratio slightly increased in the years after 
the crisis. On the other hand, the ratio of short-term debt reached its peak on 2011, and then 
decreased along the years reaching lower values than in 2003 on the year of 2016, which may 
indicate some short-term credit shortage. Therefore, the ratios of debt except, the short-term 
debt ratio, experienced a substantial rise after the year of 2008, that is the year of the 
beginning of the global financial crisis. 
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In figure 2, it is easily perceptible that the composition of debt is much more volatile 
than the level of debt as a whole, thus we can state that the firms of this industry continuously 
change the proportions of their debt. We can see a huge peak in the year of 2011, coinciding 
with the year of the bailout. At this year, the short-term debt represented almost one-half of 
the long-term debt. Afterwards, the level of short-term debt decreased against the level of 
long-term debt, although the levels remained higher compared with the period before crisis. 
This could be an indication that during the crisis firms had more difficulties in obtaining 
long-term debt, or that companies were in difficulties, so they preferred to reduce the 
proportion of long-term debt in its balance sheet. 
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Figure 1 – Ratios of debt over the period of 2003 to 2016 (using yearly means). 
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Figure 2 - Debt composition ratio over the period between 2003 and 2016 (using yearly means) 
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4.2) Correlation 
 
 Recurring to table 3 it is possible to analyze the correlations between the variables. 
It is interesting to mention that the tangibility of the assets and liquidity have a positive 
correlation with the debt ratio and the long-term debt ratio, but a negative correlation with 
the short-term debt ratio. The variables growth and profitability have a negative correlation with 
the debt ratios and size shows the opposite relation. The dummy crisis is associated with a 
positive correlation with the debt ratios. 
 
Table 4 - Pearson's correlation matrix. The variables are given by: 𝑫𝑬𝑩𝑻𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Total Debt/Total 
Assets); 𝑳𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = (Long-Term Debt/Total Assets); 𝑺𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Short-Term Debt/Total Assets); 𝑫𝑪𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = 
(Short-Term Debt/Long-Term Debt); 𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊,𝒕 = (Fixed Assets/Total Assets); 𝑳𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊,𝒕 = LN(Year-Year of 
Constitution); 𝑳𝑰𝑸𝒊,𝒕 = (Current Assets/Current Liabilities); 𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕 = LN(Total Assets);  𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝒊,𝒕 = 
(EBITDA/Total Assets); 𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯𝒊,𝒕 = LN(Fixed Assets  𝒕 ) - LN(Fixed Assets  𝒕−𝟏 ) and 𝑽𝑶𝑳𝒊,𝒕 = (Gross 
Margin/EBIT). 
 
  
 
 The explanatory variables do not show a high correlation between them, except 
between age and size, indicating that probably it will not exist a multi-collinearity problem in 
the models. 
  
 DEBTR LTDR STDR DCR TANG LAGE LIQ SIZE PROF GROWTH VOL CRISIS 
DEBTR 1.00            
LTDR 0.8548 1.00           
STDR 0.3921 -0.1421 1.00          
DCR -0.0584 -0.1746 0.1980 1.00         
TANG 0.2629 0.2876 -0.0085 -0.0616 1.00        
LAGE 0.0022 0.0121 -0.0173 -0.0074 -0.1459 1.00       
LIQ 0.1163 0.2122 -0.1543 -0.0349 -0.0307 0.0525 1.00      
SIZE 0.0943 0.0351 0.1175 -0.0185 -0.1563 0.5320 -0.0136 1.00     
PROF -0.3087 -0.2667 -0.1161 0.0153 0.0225 -0.2686 -0.0291 -0.1679 1.00    
GROWTH -0.1485 -0.1309 -0.0513 0.0360 -0.0334 -0.2420 -0.0674 -0.0336 0.3403 1.00   
VOL -0.0570 -0.0505 -0.0193 0.0055 -0.0340 0.0053 -0.0409 -0.0225 0.0128 -0.0147 1.00  
CRISIS 0.0635 0.0226   0.0809 -0.0311 -0.0379 0.0638 0.0022 -0.0463 -0.1897 -0.2067 0.0094 1.00 
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5. Empirical Results  
 
Table 5 - Results of the fixed effects estimations for two dependent variables: DBTR and LTDR. The 
dependent variables are given by 𝑫𝑬𝑩𝑻𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = (Total Debt/Total Assets) and 𝑳𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = (Long-Term Debt/Total 
Assets). The independent variables are 𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊,𝒕 = (Fixed Assets/Total Assets); 𝑳𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊,𝒕 = LN(Year-Year of 
Constitution); 𝑳𝑰𝑸𝒊,𝒕 = (Current Assets/Current Liabilities); 𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕 = LN(Total Assets);  𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝒊,𝒕 = 
(EBITDA/Total Assets); 𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯𝒊,𝒕= LN(Fixed Assets 𝒕) - (Fixed Assets 𝒕−𝟏); 𝑽𝑶𝑳𝒊,𝒕= (Gross Margin/EBIT); 
The standard deviations are within the parentheses. The coefficients of the variables are significant at 1%(***), 
5%(**) and 10%(*) levels of significance. 
 
 
 
DEBTR 
(1) 
DEBTR 
(2) 
LTDR 
(3) 
LTDR 
(4) 
C 
−0.0874963∗ 
(0.0526565) 
−0.0783244 
(0.0552545) 
0.0205136 
(0.0519588) 
−0.0065162 
(0.0359741 ) 
TANG 0.2889169
∗∗∗ 
(0.0349481) 
0.2936458∗∗∗ 
(0.036576) 
0.3159701∗∗∗ 
(0.0344851) 
0.3136164∗∗∗ 
(0.036297) 
LAGE 
0. 0378481∗∗∗ 
(0.0095335) 
0.0404102∗∗∗ 
(0.0100614 ) 
0.0500261∗∗∗ 
(0.0094072) 
0.0567354∗∗∗ 
(0.0098959) 
LIQ 0.0057595 
∗∗∗ 0.0045271∗∗∗ 0.0104858∗∗∗ 0.007838∗∗∗ 
(0.0007043) (0.0007918) (0.000695) (0.0007787) 
SIZE 0.0267218
∗∗∗ 0.0240709∗∗∗ −0.004626 −0.0030203 
(0.0064881) (0.0067015) (0.0064021) (0.0065912) 
PROF 
−0.3655798 ∗∗∗ 
(0.0237796) 
−0.3278044∗∗∗ 
(0.031908) 
−0.2536672∗∗∗ 
(0.0234645) 
−0.210474 ∗∗∗ 
(0.0313829) 
GROWTH −0.0172208
∗  
(0.0093723) 
−0.0079945 
(0.0106881) 
0.0078149 
(0.0092481) 
0.0002596 
(0.0105122) 
VOL −0.0000421 
(0.0000266 ) 
−0.0000501 
(0.0000353) 
−0.000029 
(0.0000263) 
−0.0000527 
(0.0000348) 
CRISIS 
 
 
−0.0930377∗∗∗ 
(0.0300369) 
 −0.0595108∗∗ 
(0.0295426) 
TANG*CRISIS 
 
 
−0.0232698 
(0.0323631) 
 −0.0054806  
(0.0318305) 
LAGE*CRISIS 
 0.0078356  0.0113246 
 (0.0091738)  (0.0090228) 
LIQ*CRISIS 
 0.0051039∗∗∗  0.0102777∗∗∗ 
 (0.0014081)  (0.0013849) 
SIZE*CRISIS 
 0.0092074∗∗  0.0004467 
 (0.0035992)  (0.00354) 
PROF*CRISIS 
 −0.0519991  −0.1024561∗∗ 
 (0.0439666)  (0.0432431) 
GROWTH*CRISI
S 
 −0.0256443  0.021686 
 (0.0204962)  (0.020159) 
VOL*CRISIS 
 0.0000346  0.0000602 
 (0.0000525)  (0.0000517) 
N 3776 3776 3919 3919 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Above all, the aim of this dissertation is, as it was previously mentioned, to assess the 
impact of the sovereign debt crisis over the capital structure of the real estate and 
construction related Portuguese firms. Nevertheless, we also want to study what are the main 
drivers that explain the amount of debt used by firms. Therefore, we estimated eight different 
models using four different dependent variables, which will be analyzed along this section. 
The estimation model used is the fixed effects model, and all the regressions are presented 
in the tables 5 and 6.  
The first econometric estimation, with the total debt ratio (DEBTR) as the dependent 
variable, gives us some interesting results where five out of the seven variables are significant 
at one percent level. The non-significant variable is VOL, leading us then, to reject 
hypothesis H5. 
The variable TANG is positively related with the DEBTR, as it was expected, 
corroborating the first hypothesis (H1). With an increase of 1 p.p. of the tangibility of the 
firm it is expected an increase of, approximately, 0.29 p.p. on the total debt ratio, ceteris paribus. 
This result was also found by Rajan and Zingales (1995) for most of the countries in their 
sample,  as well as by Michaelas et al. (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003). Thus, we can infer 
that firms with higher amount of fixed assets are less risky to the debtholders, which can be 
related with the fact that this type of assets is associated with lower levels of asymmetric 
information costs and they can be used as collateral to the loans.  
The variable LAGE also exerts a significant positive impact over the level of total 
debt as in Palacín-Sánchez et al. (2013) study. However, we were expecting a negative relation 
since older firms should be more stable and would have more capability to finance their own 
operations, as it was stated by the seventh hypothesis (H7), which was rejected according 
with this result. Regardless of we were expecting another result, this is not surprising because 
older firms may had already established good relations with credit institutions and are safer 
to be credit granted. On the contrary, the study performed by Michaelas et al. (1999), has 
given the opposite result, where younger firms had, on average shown higher leverage ratios. 
The relation between the profitability of the firm and the level of debt is negative. 
This result is several times reported in other studies, for instance those of Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) and  Talberg et al. (2008). In addition, this variable is one of the variables that causes 
more economic impact in the model. On average, it is estimated that a 1 p.p. increase of the 
profitability will cause a 0.37 p.p. decrease on the level of leverage of the firm, ceteris paribus. 
Thus, firms with higher profitability, on average, will engage in lower levels of debt, which is 
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in accordance with the pecking order theory, which states that firms will use first the internal 
funds generated and confirms our hypothesis 3. 
 The rejection of the hypothesis H6 relates with the fact that liquidity is associated 
with a positive correlation with debt. Although, the result of the variable liquidity it is not 
surprising because firms with higher levels of liquidity also have more capacity to service the 
debt, this result is different from the studies of these authors: Ozkan (2001),  Deesomsak et 
al. (2004) and Akdal (2012). Yet, the economic impact of this variable is very small. 
The variable SIZE exhibits a positive correlation with the level of debt. We were 
already expecting that larger firms would be less risky to creditors since the agency costs of 
debt are lower for these firms, although, in theory, they also would have more capacity to 
finance themselves. Most studies give a similar result, like the studies of Fama and French 
(2002), Frank and Goyal (2003) and Titman and Wessels (1988). The result validates 
hypothesis H2. 
According with the results, there is a negative statiscal significant relation between 
the variable GROWTH and total debt, at 10% level of significance. As such, we confirm the 
hypothesis H4, which states that growing firms carry higher risk to credit institutions, 
although the result is different from the studies of Palacín-Sánchez et al. (2013) and Titman 
and Wessels (1988) but it is in accordance with Talberg et al. (2008) either for the whole 
sample or only for construction firms subsample. 
 In the second model, it is included the dummy variable, CRISIS, and the variables 
interacting with the dummy. We can see that, on average, during periods of crisis, the total 
debt ratio is lower than in non-crisis periods, and that the dummy crisis is significant at 1% 
level of significance. With this result, the hypothesis H8 is validated. This result is in 
accordance with Akbar et al. (2013) for UK private firms but in opposition against the results 
obtained by Iqbal and Kume (2013) that have shown an increase in debt ratios for German 
and UK companies.  
 However, this effect caused by crisis is attenuated for firms that are bigger and those 
that have more liquidity, according with the results of the estimation. Therefore, we can 
conclude that during the sovereign debt crisis firms with more liquidity and bigger in size 
were less credit constrained, everything else constant. Additionally, this econometric 
estimation led us to corroborate the hypotheses H12 because we do not find any significant 
effect on the variable PROF caused by crisis. There are similar results provided by other 
studies like Harrison and Widjaja (2014) or Mouton and Smith (2016). This could be related 
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with a decrease in earnings during economically unstable periods. Since SIZE exerts a 
significant positive effect on the DBTR, during crisis, we can corroborate hypothesis H11. 
The interaction between TANG and CRISIS is insignificant, thus we reject hypothesis H10.  
 In the third model, where the dependent variable is the long-term debt ratio (LTDR) 
we can observe that the variables that were significant in the previous model were also 
significant in this one, except for the variable SIZE and GROWTH. The signs also remained 
the same, for the significant variables. Booth et al., (2001) also found similar results between 
the estimations of total debt ratio and long-term debt ratio. We can highlight that the 
economic impact caused by the variable TANG increased, which makes sense since credit 
institutions will require more collateral to grant long-term. On the other hand, PROF reduced 
its economic impact but maintained the negative sign like in Michaelas et al. (1999). They 
suggest that as more internal profits are accumulated, the long-term financing will be 
substituted by equity. We corroborate hypothesis H1a and we reject H2a because the variable 
is insignificant in this model. The variable GROWTH is insignificant in this model. 
 The fourth model also has the long-term debt ratio as the dependent variable, but 
variables related with the impact of crisis were also included. Like the previous model, in this 
one the results are almost the same as those on the model with the DEBTR. The sovereign 
debt crisis still exerts a negative impact over the level of leverage of the firms. However, the 
negative impact is smaller for this type of financing, which could mean that the supply of 
long-term debt was not as affected as debt as a whole. In addition, the level of significance 
also reduced to 5%. 
 Again, the level of liquidity attenuates the impact of the crisis. It could be related 
with higher ability to service the debt, although, firms that are more profitable have lower 
levels of debt during crisis, so they could prefer to finance their own operations. 
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Table 6 - Results of the fixed effects estimations for two dependent variables: STDR and DCR. The 
dependent variables are given by 𝑺𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Short-Term Debt/Total Assets) and 𝑫𝑪𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = (Short-Term 
Debt/Long-Term Debt). The independent variables are 𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊,𝒕 = (Fixed Assets/Total Assets); 𝑳𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊,𝒕 = 
LN(Year-Year of Constitution); 𝑳𝑰𝑸𝒊,𝒕 = (Current Assets/Current Liabilities); 𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕 = LN(Total Assets);  
𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝒊,𝒕 = (EBITDA/Total Assets); 𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯𝒊,𝒕 = LN(Fixed Assets  𝒕 ) - (Fixed Assets  𝒕−𝟏 ); 𝑽𝑶𝑳𝒊,𝒕 = (Gross 
Margin/EBIT); The standard deviations are within the parentheses The coefficients of the variables are 
significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels of significance. 
 
  
 STDR 
(5) 
STDR 
(6) 
DCR 
(7) 
DCR 
(8) 
C 
−0.1080099∗∗∗ 
(0.0383089) 
−0.0718082∗ 
(0.0264912) 
−1.061931 
(5.618111) 
−0.5563139 
(5.966643)   
TANG 
−0.0270531 
(0.0254256) 
−0.0199705 
(0.0262343) 
0.2181853 
(3.486137) 
0.2499148 
(3.689693) 
LAGE 
−0.0121779∗ 
(0.0069359) 
−0.0163252∗∗ 
(0.0072873) 
0.1333085 
(0.9889161) 
0.1642729 
(1.041768) 
LIQ 
−0.003638∗∗∗ −0.0033109∗∗∗ −0.082415 −0.0722055 
(0.005124) (0.0005735) (0.063691) (0.0715675) 
SIZE 
0.0313478∗∗∗ 0.0270913∗∗∗ 0.3962728 0.2043195 
(0.0047202) (0.0048538) (0.6630651) (0.6903147) 
PROF 
−0. 1119125∗∗∗ 
(0.0173002) 
−0.1173305∗∗∗ 
(0.0231103) 
−1.138483 
(2.498139) 
−1.63853 
(3.589587 
GROWTH 
−0.0250357∗∗∗ 
(0.0068186) 
−0.008254 
(0.0077412)  
1.673414∗ 
(1.015628) 
1.939286∗∗∗ 
(1.185546) 
VOL 
−0.0000132 
(0.0000194) 
2.55𝑒 − 06 
(0.0000256) 
0.0016002 
(0.0025808) 
0.0002438 
(0.0033869) 
CRISIS 
 −0.0335268 
(0.0217551) 
 −0.1938421 
(3.063735) 
TANG*CRISIS 
 −0.0177893 
(0.0234399) 
 −0.2027137 
(3.105359) 
LAGE*CRISIS 
 −0.003489   −1.67737∗ 
 (0.0066444)  (0.8922235) 
LIQ*CRISIS 
 −0. 0051738∗∗∗  −0.0394244 
 (0.0010198)  (0.1291748) 
SIZE*CRISIS 
 0.0087607∗∗∗  0.594033∗ 
 (0.0026068)  (0.3513879) 
PROF*CRISIS 
 0.0504571  0.3317407 
 (0.0318441)  (4.644498) 
GROWTH*CRISIS 
 −0.0473303∗∗∗  −0.7070725 
 (0.014845)  (2.157361) 
VOL*CRISIS 
 −2.0000257  0.0028191 
 (0.0000381)  (0.0051622) 
N 3918 3918 3169 3169 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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The table 6 gives us the models that incorporate the short-term debt ratio (STDR) 
and the debt composition ratio (DCR) as dependent variables. The model 5 rejects the 
hypotheses H2b because the variable SIZE is associated with a positive signal. We were 
expecting that smaller firms would rely more on short-term debt because it would be more 
difficult and expensive for them to be financed by long-term debt. However, the evidence 
demonstrates that larger firms have more short-term debt, which can be related with more 
working capital fluctuations and the use of different types of short-term debt. Regarding the 
variable GROWTH, in theory we could expect that growing companies would rely more on 
short-term due to their higher risk for banks, however we observe a negative relation with 
the STDR.  
 The tests also rejected the hypothesis H1b since the variable TANG became 
insignificant in this model unlike the previous specifications. Thus, this could be a sign that 
the tangibility of the assets is important for companies with regard to long-term debt, but it 
is not that important for banks when they provide short-term debt. 
LIQ as in Proença et al. (2014) study presented a negative coefficient for STDR and 
a positive coefficient for LTDR, suggesting that firms with higher liquidity levels tend to 
issue long-term debt instead of short-term debt. We can also observe a negative relation 
between LAGE and STDR, although it is only significant at a 10% level of confidence. This 
is an interesting result because it shows that younger firms have more short-term credit than 
older firms do and taking into account that age is associated with a positive relation with 
LTDR, it helps to support the evidence that younger firms are riskier than older firms are 
and that the costs of long-term debt are higher for smaller firms. 
Our statistical evidence demonstrates that the crisis did not affect the short-term 
ratio. Therefore, we reject H9 that stated that firms would have higher amounts of short-
term debt during periods of crisis. Even so, this result can indicate that banks were less 
restricted in offering short-term debt comparing with long-term debt, which is an interesting 
result. 
In relation to the other variables, during the crisis, bigger firms have greater ability 
to access short-term credit, everything else constant. On the other hand, firms with more 
liquidity engage, on average, in lower levels of short-term debt during crisis, which can be 
related with less working capital management problems since the firms have more liquid 
assets, therefore may not need so much short-term financing. In addition, firms that are 
growing more have a lower STDR during the crisis, which is reasonable since these firms 
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present higher risk to the banks, in theory, and in unstable economic periods banks may be 
even more averse in granting finance to these firms. 
 The purpose of model 7 and 8 was to understand which factors led to the decision 
of the composition of debt by companies. Most of the variables are not significant. In model 
7, we observe that GROWTH is significant at 10% level of significance. The sign and 
significance of the variable GROWTH is very interesting, the positive coefficient may be a 
sign that firms in growth have more short-term debt necessity than long-term-debt 
comparing with more stagnated firms, or it may be related with the risk associated with these 
companies. Banks may be reluctant to grant credit to firms that are growing because they 
may have more incentives to engage in riskier investments, and it may be harder to monitor 
them, so they will have a higher ponderation of short-term debt. 
Results from model 8 show us that the sovereign debt crisis by itself did not cause 
an effect over the level of short-term debt in relation to long-term debt. Although we can 
see that age exercises a negative impact over this ratio during the sovereign debt crisis, size 
exercises a positive impact on the ratio during crisis. 
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6. Robustness Checks  
 
Along this section, we will analyze several models that will be used as a complement 
to our overall results. Those models will be important to test the robustness of our 
conclusions by dividing the sample in different subsamples. Our models will follow the 
specifications described in table 7. 
 
               Table 7 - List of the robustness models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We will estimate each of these models using three different dependent variables: 
DEBTR, LTDR and STDR. After analyzing the estimations, we want to assess if these 
sample restrictions cause a substantial difference either on the capital structure determinants 
either on the impact of the crisis, comparing with the overall results of this dissertation, 
estimated in the previous section. We decided not to include an estimation with the 
dependent variable DCR since it became explicit in the previous section that the variables 
included in the model did not contribute to the explanation of this ratio. 
 The estimations concerning the models described in table 7 can be found in the 
appendix of this dissertation. The first model (9), which includes only firms with a growth 
higher than the average, presents some interesting results. It is easily perceptible that the 
determinants of capital structure, in general, maintain the signs, except for the variable related 
with age that is insignificant for the DEBTR estimation while in the model of the previous 
Models Specification 
Model 9 
The model includes only firms with a growth higher than 
the average. 
Model 10 The model includes only firms with a growth lower than 
the average. 
Model 11 The model includes only firms with a size higher than the 
average. 
Model 12 The model includes only firms with a size lower than the 
average. 
Model 13  The model includes only firms where the EBIT is 
positive. 
Model 14 The model includes only firms where the EBIT is 
negative. 
Model 15 The model includes only firms with a profitability higher 
than the average. 
Model 16 The model includes only firms with a profitability lower 
than the average. 
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section was positive and significant. In addition, the variable SIZE is positive and significant 
for the LTDR, and it was insignificant in model 3. However, the most interesting result is 
related with the dummy crisis because the results are substantially different from those of 
the previous section. First, the variable crisis is not significant for the dependent variable 
DEBTR, and is positive and negative for LTDR and STDR, respectively. Therefore, the 
companies that have a growth higher than the average have more long-term debt and less 
short-term debt during the crisis. This result was unanticipated since we were expecting that 
firms with higher growth would be riskier for banks, thus, they would have less long-term 
debt and more short-term debt during crisis, however, the model provides different evidence. 
 In model 10, which includes firms with growth lower than the average, we found 
similar results to those of section 5, except for certain exceptions. It is the first model where 
the variable VOL is significant at a 10% level of significance and shows a negative sign, as 
expected, although the economic impact of this variable is practically nil. Overall, the signs 
of the determinants are similar to the overall results and to the previous one. However, unlike 
the previous model, in this one the dummy CRISIS has exactly the same signs of the overall 
results, meaning that firms that have lower growth than the average have lower ratios of debt 
during the crisis period. 
 Both models 11 and 12, which divide firms between those that are bigger and smaller 
than the average, do not show any evidence of an impact caused by crisis on the capital 
structure of the firms, since the dummies related with the crisis are insignificant in all 
estimations of these models. Therefore, this evidence combined with that from model 9 
suggests that the evidence, related with crisis, of the overall results described in the previous 
section, was not as robust as we might have thought.  Nevertheless, the signs of the 
determinants are similar between these models and those of the overall results, except for 
the estimations that uses STDR as the dependent variable. In model 12, there is only one 
significant variable and in model 11, the variable TANG is negative, which could mean that 
firms with a lower value of tangible assets have more short-term debt because they have less 
flexibility in collateralize long-term debt, in relation to the sub-sample of firms that are bigger 
than the average.  
 Models 13 and 14 reflect similar results to the previous two. Again, there is not any 
evidence of an impact caused by the crisis. We can infer by the number of observations of 
the model 14 that there are few observations with negative values for EBIT. The evidence 
related with the determinants is similar to the overall results, although we have an interesting 
 
 
39 
significant negative coefficient for the variable SIZE in model 14, which could mean that 
bigger firms with negative EBIT prefer not to engage in long-term debt or that banks input 
more restrictions for these firms. 
 Some interesting evidence is provided by model 15 because it shows that firms with 
higher profitability than the average have higher long-term debt ratios and lower short-term 
debt ratios, during the sovereign debt crisis. In our opinion this could mean that these firms 
were not so affected by the restrictions imposed by banks and that they had less necessity to 
engage in short-term debt due to the higher profitability. In addition, this model has less 
significant variables than the overall results. Thus, firms that are more profitable have less 
determinants explaining its capital structure which could be sign that this firms are submitted 
to less constraints by banks, since SIZE and LAGE are insignificant. 
Firms that have lower profitability than the average, described by model 16 provide 
results that are substantially different from the previous model. In this model, we have more 
significant variables than in the other. Even VOL is significant at 10% although its economic 
impact is residual. This evidence could indicate that less profitable firms are exposed to more 
conditionings by banks, in opposition to the more profitable ones. None of the estimations 
of this model provides evidence of an impact in the capital structure of firms caused by the 
crisis. 
To summarize, on one hand these models give us evidence that the results related 
with the determinants of the capital structure are relatively strong but on the other hand, the 
evidence related with crisis seems to be weak. Therefore, it is difficult to formulate accurate 
conclusions regarding the impact of the sovereign debt crisis on the capital structure of the 
Portuguese real estate and construction related firms.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
The main question, which led to the development of this dissertation, was related 
with the impact that the sovereign debt crisis caused on the capital structure of real estate 
and construction related companies. 
 The results obtained in the study did not provide a strong evidence that the crisis 
has produced any type of impact over the capital structure of the firms. Although the 
empirical evidence of the overall results had demonstrated that during periods of crisis firms 
have, on average, a lower ratio of total debt and long-term debt ratio, the robustness tests of 
section 6 demonstrate that the evidence related with the impact of the crisis is weak. 
Therefore, this dissertation cannot fully support the previous studies that found 
modifications in the capital structure of companies caused by economic recession periods, 
like the crisis in focus. 
 According with the overall results in section 5, the industry in focus (real estate and 
construction), in Portugal, was affected by the sovereign debt crisis regarding credit access, 
but not all of the tested debt ratios were affected. The short-term debt ratio as well as the 
composition of debt within the companies, given by the debt composition ratio, were not 
significantly affected by the crisis. Other studies, like Fosberg (2012) or Brendea (2013) also 
found changes in capital structure caused by the crisis, however their evidence showed a 
positive impact in the ratios of debt. 
The overall results reflect some of the consequences advanced by the studies that 
focused on the modifications in the credit supply caused by the sovereign debt crisis in the 
peripheral European countries. At the time, society in general was not aware of the huge 
problems banks were experiencing, but they were serious. This instability of the banking 
system also could have contributed to this negative impact of the crisis in the debt ratios, like 
the severe liquidity problems that they were suffering. Thus, one of the conclusions that can 
be drawn from this study is that there was a credit supply shortage (Zeitun et al., 2016; 
Albertazzi et al.,2014), that can be related with Portuguese banks losing access to debt 
markets (Antunes and Martinho, 2012), however it appears that the short-term debt supply 
was not so affected. Additionally, it could have occurred some increase in the costs of the 
loans for non-financial firms (Neri, 2010). Therefore, the negative impact on the debt ratios 
could also have been caused by a lower corporate demand due to the higher costs, mainly 
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caused by higher spreads and not by reference interest rates that have fallen to historically 
low values. 
Nevertheless, we have to mention that the intervention in Portugal’s bailout by the 
TROIKA also could had contributed to credit restrictions by the banking system and the way 
firms financed their operations during this period, with the implementation of several 
austerity measures in the economy. 
In relation to the firm-specific variables, we have found very interesting results, 
where we rejected and confirmed some of the formulated hypotheses in section 2. In relation 
to the variable TANG we validated two out of the three hypotheses. We found a significant 
positive relation between the tangibility of the firm and the total debt and long-term debt 
ratios and an insignificant relation with the short-term debt ratio, suggesting that banks do 
not take into account in this industry the relative importance of tangible assets within firms 
when they grant short-term debt.  
Only one of the hypotheses related with SIZE was corroborated. The empirical 
evidence showed a significant positive relation between SIZE and the total debt ratio, as the 
majority of studies. However, the relation with the long-term debt ratio was insignificant and 
positive with short-term debt. This last result was unexpected because we were expecting 
that smaller firms would rely more on short-term debt.  
PROF was the variable with higher economic impact and significant in the most 
relevant models. It kept a negative coefficient in the models, like in the study of Proença et 
al. (2014), giving support to the pecking order theory. 
The variable GROWTH was significant and negative for the total debt ratio and the 
short-term ratio, being insignificant for the long-term debt ratio. Therefore, the respective 
hypothesis was confirmed. This negative relation suggests that growing companies are riskier 
for banks. 
The variable VOL was not significant in any of the models. This could mean that 
these variables are not important in the explanation of the capital structure for the firms of 
this industry or that the proxies used to assess the impact of the variables were not good. 
The coefficients of the variables LIQ and AGE presented signs that were the opposite of 
what we were expecting. Thus, firms with more liquidity or older, on average present higher 
levels of leverage.  
During the crisis period, we have found that larger firms had more facility to grant 
credit and that individually, the variable TANG did not exercise any effect during crisis, for 
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any of the models, which is in accordance with the results given by Deesomsak et al. (2004).  
The variable PROF, also did not exert any effect during crisis on the total and short-term 
debt ratio. 
The main differences between the models was the change in sign (from positive to 
negative) of the variable LIQ for short-term debt.  The variable SIZE had explanatory power 
in the models for DEBTR and STDR, while in the LTDR the variable was not significant 
anymore. Regarding the composition of debt, our models 7 and 8 did not found much 
evidence about which variables are important to its explanation. 
The robustness tests performed in the last section gave support to the overall results 
related with the determinants of capital structure, although they have exhibited that the 
evidence associated with the impact of the crisis to be weak.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 8 - Estimations’ results including only firms with a growth higher than the average. The standard 
deviations are within the parentheses. The variables are given by: 𝑫𝑬𝑩𝑻𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Total Debt/Total Assets); 
𝑳𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = (Long-Term Debt/Total Assets); 𝑺𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Short-Term Debt/Total Assets); 𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊,𝒕 = (Fixed 
Assets/Total Assets); 𝑳𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊,𝒕= LN(Year-Year of Constitution); 𝑳𝑰𝑸𝒊,𝒕= (Current Assets/Current Liabilities); 
𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕= LN(Total Assets);  𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝒊,𝒕= (EBITDA/Total Assets); 𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯𝒊,𝒕= LN(Fixed Assets  𝒕) - (Fixed 
Assets 𝒕−𝟏) and 𝑽𝑶𝑳𝒊,𝒕= (Gross Margin/EBIT). The coefficients of the variables are significant at 1%(***), 
5%(***) and 10%(***) levels of significance. 
 
Model 9 DEBTR DEBTR LTDR LTDR STDR STDR 
C 
−0.173806∗∗∗ −0. 1926275∗∗∗ −0.0938893∗∗ −0.1750318∗∗∗ −0. 0799167∗∗ −0.0175956 
(0.0491978) (0.0512542) (0.0466529) (0.0478086) (0.0376268) (0.0387508) 
TANG 
0. 310604∗∗∗ 0.3305153∗∗∗ 0. 3497026∗∗∗ 0. 3926416∗∗∗ −.0390986 −0. 0621263∗ 
(0.044233) (0.0456445) (0.041945) (0.042576) (0.0338297) (0.0345096) 
LAGE 
−0.002332 −0.0015987 0. 0173002∗ 0.0147902 −0. 0196322∗∗ −0. 0163888∗ 
(0.0106634) (0.0112066) (0.0101118) (0.0104533) (0.0081554) (0.0084728) 
LIQ 
0.0225445∗∗∗ 0. 0267662∗∗∗ 0. 0284988∗∗∗ 0. 0423513∗∗∗ −0. 0059543∗∗∗ −0. 015585∗∗∗ 
(0.0014511) (0.0029163) (0.001376) (0.0027202) (0.0011098) (0.0022048) 
SIZE 
0.0471415∗∗∗ 0. 04598∗∗∗ 0. 015695∗∗ 0. 0216832∗∗∗ 0. 0314464∗∗∗ 0. 0242968∗∗∗ 
(0.0071685) (0.007476) (0.0067977) (0.0069735) (0.0054825) (0.0056523) 
PROF 
−0.3650116∗∗∗ −0. 2577781∗∗∗ −0. 2685642∗∗∗ −0. 1698124∗∗∗ −0. 0964474∗∗∗ −0. 0879656∗∗∗ 
(0.0318375) (0.0405548) (0.0301906) (0.0378285) (0.0243495) (0.0000409) 
VOL 
−0.0000365 −.000032 −0.0000363 −0.0000427 −2.12𝑒 − 07 0.0000107 
(0.000043) (0.0000541) (0.0000407) (0.0000505) (0.0000329) (0.0301306) 
CRISIS 
 0.0402679  0. 1747153∗∗∗  −0. 1344475∗∗∗ 
 (0.0398526)  (0.0371735)  (0.0376833) 
TANG*CRISIS 
 −0.0932393∗  −0. 1960208∗∗∗  0. 1027816∗∗∗ 
 (0.0498422)  (0.0464915)  (0.009809) 
LAGE*CRISIS 
 −0.0102599  −0.0105692  0.0003093 
 (0.0129739)  (0.0121017)  (0.0024248) 
LIQ*CRISIS 
 −0.0051858  −0. 0177816∗∗∗  0. 0125958∗∗∗ 
 (0.0032072)  (0.0029916)  (0.0037814) 
SIZE*CRISIS 
 0.0052181  −0. 0089499∗  0. 014168∗∗∗ 
 (0.0050015)  (0.0046653)  (0.0454726) 
PROF*CRISIS 
 −0. 2612768∗∗∗  −0. 2667637∗∗∗  0.0054869 
 (0.0601448)  (0.0561015)  (0.000065) 
VOL*CRISIS 
 −0.0000201  0.0000145  −0.0000345 
 (0.000086)  (0.0000802)  (0.0387508) 
N 1639 1639 1639 1639 1639 1639 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 9 - Estimations’ results including only firms with a growth lower than the average. The standard 
deviations are within the parentheses. The variables are given by: 𝑫𝑬𝑩𝑻𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Total Debt/Total Assets); 
𝑳𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = (Long-Term Debt/Total Assets); 𝑺𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Short-Term Debt/Total Assets); 𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊,𝒕 = (Fixed 
Assets/Total Assets); 𝑳𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊,𝒕= LN(Year-Year of Constitution); 𝑳𝑰𝑸𝒊,𝒕= (Current Assets/Current Liabilities); 
𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕= LN(Total Assets);  𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝒊,𝒕= (EBITDA/Total Assets); 𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯𝒊,𝒕= LN(Fixed Assets  𝒕) - (Fixed 
Assets 𝒕−𝟏) and 𝑽𝑶𝑳𝒊,𝒕= (Gross Margin/EBIT). The coefficients of the variables are significant at 1%(***), 
5%(***) and 10%(***) levels of significance. 
 
 
Model 10 DEBTR DEBTR LTDR LTDR STDR STDR 
C 
−0.2938286∗∗∗ −0. 2241301  −0.077816  −0.0926288  −0. 2160126∗∗∗ 0.1315013∗ 
(0.0919388) (0.0960053) (0.0923559) (0.0963149) (0.066004) (0.0681264) 
TANG 
0. 2212626∗∗∗ 0.208508∗∗∗ 0. 2471482∗∗∗ 0. 2114659∗∗∗ −0.0258857 −0.0029579 
(0.0433562) (0.0458738) (0.0435529) (0.0460217) (0.0311259) (0.0098187) 
LAGE 
0.0868411∗∗∗ 0.0832875∗∗∗ 0.0729993∗∗∗ 0.2114659∗∗∗ 0.0138417 0.0000819 
(0.0124595) (0.0138367) (0.0125161) (0.0138814) (0.0089449) (0.0006063) 
LIQ 
0. 0024526∗∗∗ 0. 0030422∗∗∗ 0. 0071019∗∗∗ 0.0061629∗∗∗ −0.0046493∗∗∗ −0.0031207∗∗∗ 
(0.0008106) (0.0008544) (0.0008142) (0.0008571) (0.0005819) (0.0069212) 
SIZE 
0.0340118∗∗∗ 0. 0267333∗∗∗ 0.0001532 −0. 0007469  0. 0338586∗∗∗ 0.0274802∗∗∗ 
(0.0095033) (0.0097535) (0.0095464) (0.0097849) (0.0068225) (0.0288755) 
PROF 
−0.3194998∗∗∗ −0. 3084508∗∗∗ −0. 1921174∗∗∗ −0. 1810321∗∗∗ −0. 1273824∗∗∗ −0.1274187∗∗∗   
(0.0293835) (0.040692) (0.0295168) (0.0408232) (0.0210947) (0.0000302) 
VOL 
−0. 0000549∗ −.0000659 −0.0000345 −0.0000534 −.0000204 −0.0000125 
(0.0000323) (0.0000425) (0.0000325) (0.0000427) (0.0000232) (0.0319191) 
CRISIS 
 −0.1409719∗∗∗  −0.1771753∗∗∗  0.0362034 
 (0.0449812)  (0.0451262)  (0.0291163) 
TANG*CRISIS 
 0.0245933  0. 0927721∗∗  −0.0681788∗∗ 
 (0.0410313)  (0.0411636)  (0.0098105) 
LAGE*CRISIS 
 0.020493  0.0332243∗∗  −0.0127313 
 (0.0138252)  (0.0138698)  (0.001371) 
LIQ*CRISIS 
 −0.0033796∗  0. 0072004∗∗∗  −0.01058∗∗∗ 
 (0.0019321)  (0.0019383)  (0.0034062) 
SIZE*CRISIS 
 0.0109598∗∗  0.0045743  0.0063855∗ 
 (0.0048)  (0.0048155)  (0.0382446) 
PROF*CRISIS 
 −0.0018989  −0. 035957    0.0340581 
 (0.0538951)  (0.0540689)  (0.0000458) 
VOL*CRISIS 
 0.0000397  0.0000521  −0.0000124 
 (0.0000645)  (0.0000647)  (0.0000458) 
N 2474 2474 2474 2474 2474 2474 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 10 - Estimations’ results including only firms with a size higher than the average. The standard 
deviations are within the parentheses. The variables are given by: 𝑫𝑬𝑩𝑻𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Total Debt/Total Assets); 
𝑳𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = (Long-Term Debt/Total Assets); 𝑺𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Short-Term Debt/Total Assets); 𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊,𝒕 = (Fixed 
Assets/Total Assets); 𝑳𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊,𝒕= LN(Year-Year of Constitution); 𝑳𝑰𝑸𝒊,𝒕= (Current Assets/Current Liabilities); 
𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕= LN(Total Assets);  𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝒊,𝒕= (EBITDA/Total Assets); 𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯𝒊,𝒕= LN(Fixed Assets  𝒕) - (Fixed 
Assets 𝒕−𝟏) and 𝑽𝑶𝑳𝒊,𝒕= (Gross Margin/EBIT). The coefficients of the variables are significant at 1%(***), 
5%(***) and 10%(***) levels of significance. 
 
 
Model 11 DEBTR DEBTR LTDR LTDR STDR STDR 
C 
0.0224555  0.0549161 −0.0556792 −0.0412955 0.0781347∗∗ 0.0962116∗∗ 
(0.0478236) (0.0514553) (0.0488967) (0.0527109) (0.0357548) (0.0379327) 
TANG 
0.2391747∗∗∗ 0.295483∗∗∗ 0.3223608∗∗∗ 0.3360352∗∗∗ −0.0831861∗∗ −0.0405522 
(0.0501762) (0.0526493) (0.0513021) (0.0539341) (0.0375137) (0.0388129) 
LAGE 
0.0861581∗∗∗ 0.0724489∗∗∗ 0.0660098∗∗∗ 0.0634821∗∗∗ 0.0201483∗ 0.0089668 
(0.0145642) (0.0159158) (0.014891) (0.0163042) (0.0108887) (0.0117331) 
LIQ 
0.0020257∗∗ 0.0025794∗∗∗ 0.0066119∗∗∗ 0.0056701∗∗∗ −0.0045862∗∗∗ −0.0030907∗∗∗ 
(0.0007929) (0.0008284) (0.0008107) (0.0008486) (0.0005928) (0.0006107) 
PROF 
−0.5307516∗∗∗ −0.5963052∗∗∗ −0.3010986∗∗∗ −0.379708∗∗∗ −0.229653∗∗∗ −0.2165972∗∗∗ 
(0.0377456) (0.0524059) (0.0385925) (0.0536848) (0.0282201) (0.0386335) 
GROWTH 
−0.017607 −0.0130704 0.0002598 −0.0043821 −0.0178668∗ −0.0086883 
(0.0140053) (0.016422) (0.0143196) (0.0168227) (0.0104709) (0.0121062) 
VOL 
−0.0000595∗ −0.0000674 −0.0000465 −0.0000747 −0.000013 7.24𝑒 − 06 
(0.0000346) (0.0000468) (0.0000354) (0.000048) (0.0000259) (0.0000345) 
CRISIS 
 −0.0182205   −0.0488422  0.0306217 
 (0.0399912)  (0.0409672)  (0.0294814) 
TANG*CRISIS 
 −0.1078744∗∗∗  −0.0365768  −0.0712976∗∗ 
 (0.0397135)  (0.0406826)  (0.0292767) 
LAGE*CRISIS 
 0.0163107  0.0095438  0.0067669 
 (0.0116551)  (0.0119396)  (0.0085921) 
LIQ*CRISIS 
 −0.0047036∗∗  0.0066721∗∗∗  −0.0113758∗∗∗ 
 (0.0019097)  (0.0019563)  (0.0014078) 
PROF*CRISIS 
 0.1610351∗∗  0.1351885∗  0.0258466 
 (0.0695354)  (0.0712322)  (0.0512613) 
GROWTH*CRISIS 
 −0.0160957  −0.0024002  −0.0136955 
 (0.0312903)  (0.0320539)  (0.0230671) 
VOL*CRISIS 
 0.0000288  0.0000564  −0.0000276 
 (0.0000683)  (0.00007)  (0.0000504) 
N 2188 2188 2188 2188 2188 2188 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 11 - Estimations’ results including only firms with a size lower than the average. The standard 
deviations are within the parentheses. The variables are given by: 𝑫𝑬𝑩𝑻𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Total Debt/Total Assets); 
𝑳𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = (Long-Term Debt/Total Assets); 𝑺𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Short-Term Debt/Total Assets); 𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊,𝒕 = (Fixed 
Assets/Total Assets); 𝑳𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊,𝒕= LN(Year-Year of Constitution); 𝑳𝑰𝑸𝒊,𝒕= (Current Assets/Current Liabilities); 
𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕= LN(Total Assets);  𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝒊,𝒕= (EBITDA/Total Assets); 𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯𝒊,𝒕= LN(Fixed Assets  𝒕) - (Fixed 
Assets 𝒕−𝟏) and 𝑽𝑶𝑳𝒊,𝒕= (Gross Margin/EBIT). The coefficients of the variables are significant at 1%(***), 
5%(***) and 10%(***) levels of significance. 
 
Model 12 DEBTR DEBTR LTDR LTDR STDR STDR 
C 
0.0976162 0.0977547∗∗∗ −0.0090294 −0.0301135 0.1066456∗∗∗ 0.1278682∗∗∗ 
(0.0309143) (0.0321282) (0.0293655) (0.0304295) (0.0226016) (0.0234603) 
TANG 
0.2615271∗∗∗ 0.2235845∗∗∗ 0.3128349∗∗∗ 0.2929753∗∗∗ −0.0513079 −0.0693909∗ 
(0.0463371) (0.0491678) (0.0440158) (0.0465682) (0.0338774) (0.0359027) 
LAGE 
0.0350623∗∗∗ 0.0382121∗∗∗ 0.0344129∗∗∗ 0.0453049∗∗∗ 0.0006494 −0.0070928 
(0.0110061) (0.0116889) (0.0104547) (0.0110709) (0.0080466) (0.0085353) 
LIQ 
0.0161868∗∗∗ 0.011878∗∗∗ 0.0213059∗∗∗ 0.0185873∗∗∗ −0.0051191∗∗∗ −0.0067093∗∗∗ 
(0.0013776) (0.0021408) (0.0013086) (0.0020276) (0.0010072) (0.0015632) 
PROF 
−0.2559434∗∗∗ −0.1887411∗∗∗ −0.2289349∗∗∗ −0.1319695∗∗∗ −0.0270085 −0.0567716∗ 
(0.0301079) (0.0398306) (0.0285996) (0.0377247) (0.0220121) (0.0290846) 
GROWTH 
0.0142404 0.0110854 0.0178078 0.0063693 −0.0035674 0.0047161 
(0.0115857) (0.0133762) (0.0110053) (0.0126689) (0.0084704) (0.0097674) 
VOL 
−0.0000202 −0.0000239 −0.0000109 −0.0000244 −9.24𝑒 − 06 4.19𝑒 − 07 
(0.00004) (0.000052) (0.000038) (0.0000493) (0.0000292) (0.000038) 
CRISIS 
 −0.0498918  −0.0275384   0.0223534 
 (0.0377114)  (0.0357175)  (0..0275372) 
TANG*CRISIS 
 0.0943244∗  0.0125263  0.0817981∗∗ 
 (0.0534941)  (0.0506657)  (0..0390618) 
LAGE*CRISIS 
 0.0122829  0.0064208  0.0058621 
 (0.0133588)  (0.0126524)  (0.0097547) 
LIQ*CRISIS 
 0.0069171∗∗∗  0.0045696∗  0.0023475 
 (0.0026007)  (0.0024632)  (0.001899) 
PROF*CRISIS 
 −0.1280209∗∗  −0.2283848∗∗∗  0.1003639∗∗ 
 (0.0565553)  (0.0535651)  (0.0412972) 
GROWTH*CRISIS 
 0.0096377  0.0323104  −0.0226726 
 (0.0266611)  (0.0252514)  (0.0194681) 
VOL*CRISIS 
 0.0000278  0.0000534  −0.0000255 
 (0.0000793)  (0.0000751)  (0.0000579) 
N 1588 1588 1588 1588 1588 1588 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 12 - Estimations’ results including only firms with an EBIT higher than zero. The standard 
deviations are within the parentheses. The variables are given by: 𝑫𝑬𝑩𝑻𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Total Debt/Total Assets); 
𝑳𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = (Long-Term Debt/Total Assets); 𝑺𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Short-Term Debt/Total Assets); 𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊,𝒕 = (Fixed 
Assets/Total Assets); 𝑳𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊,𝒕= LN(Year-Year of Constitution); 𝑳𝑰𝑸𝒊,𝒕= (Current Assets/Current Liabilities); 
𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕= LN(Total Assets);  𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝒊,𝒕= (EBITDA/Total Assets); 𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯𝒊,𝒕= LN(Fixed Assets  𝒕) - (Fixed 
Assets 𝒕−𝟏) and 𝑽𝑶𝑳𝒊,𝒕= (Gross Margin/EBIT). The coefficients of the variables are significant at 1%(***), 
5%(***) and 10%(***) levels of significance. 
 
 
Model 13 DEBTR DEBTR LTDR LTDR STDR STDR 
C 
−0.2455601∗∗∗ −0.2317903∗∗∗ −0.1042646∗∗ −0.1339191∗∗∗ −0.1412955∗∗∗ −0.0978712∗∗ 
(0.0486614) (0.050729) (0.0468132) (0.1339191) (0.0374649) (0.0388136) 
TANG 
0.2091422∗∗∗ 0.2081152∗∗∗ 0.2732591∗∗∗ 0.284859∗∗∗ −0.064117∗∗ −0.0767439∗∗∗ 
(0.0342256) (0.0359612) (0.0329257) (0.0344102) (0.0263506) (0.0275145) 
LAGE 
0.033087∗∗∗ 0.0303617∗∗∗ 0.0438378∗∗∗ 0.0464454∗∗∗ −0.0107508 −0.0160837∗∗ 
(0.008862) (0.0093014) (0.0085254) (0.0089003) (0.0068229) (0.0071167) 
LIQ 
0.0073965∗∗∗ 0.006419∗∗∗ 0.0135391∗∗∗ 0.0113245∗∗∗ −0.0061426∗∗∗ −0.0049056∗∗∗ 
(0.0008768) (0.0009462) (0.0008435) (0.0009054) (0.0006751) (0.0007239) 
SIZE 
0.0420582∗∗∗ 0.0410451∗∗∗ 0.0079131 0.0112∗ 0.0341451∗∗∗ 0.0298451∗∗∗ 
(0.0063417) (0.0065674) (0.0061009) (0.0062841) (0.0048826) (0.0050248) 
GROWTH 
0.000368 0.0080326 0.0127209 0.0084099 −0.0123528∗ −0.0003773 
(0.0087944) (0.009878) (0.0084604) (0.009452) (0.0067709) (0.0075578) 
VOL 
0.0000592∗ 0.0000584 0.0000431 0.0000284 0.0000161 0.00003 
(0.0000314) (0.00004) (0.0000302) (0.0000383) (0.0000242) (0.0000306) 
CRISIS 
 −0.0393694  −0.0395717  0.0002024 
 (0.0301608)  (0.0288601)  (0.0230765) 
TANG*CRISIS 
 0.0065612  −0.0534068  0.059968∗∗ 
 (0.037863)  (0.03623)  (0.0289696) 
LAGE*CRISIS 
 0.0011619  0.0132438  −0.0120819∗ 
 (0.0094157)  (0.0090097)  (0.0072041) 
LIQ*CRISIS 
 0.0054553∗∗∗  0.0118179∗  −0.0063626∗∗∗ 
 (0.0019931)  (0.0019071)  (0.001525) 
SIZE*CRISIS 
 0.0044648  −0.0026365  0.0071013∗∗ 
 (0.0039707)  (0.0037995)  (0.003038) 
GROWTH*CRISIS 
 −0.0039707  0.0073397  −0.0330157∗∗ 
 (0.0202614)  (0.0193875)  (0.0155023) 
VOL*CRISIS 
 −7.90𝑒 − 06  0.00000361  −0.000044  
 (0.0000604)  (0.0000578)  (0.0000462) 
N 3095 3095 3095 3095 3095 3095 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 13 - Estimations’ results including only firms with an EBIT lower than zero. The standard 
deviations are within the parentheses. The variables are given by: 𝑫𝑬𝑩𝑻𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Total Debt/Total Assets); 
𝑳𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = (Long-Term Debt/Total Assets); 𝑺𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Short-Term Debt/Total Assets); 𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊,𝒕 = (Fixed 
Assets/Total Assets); 𝑳𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊,𝒕= LN(Year-Year of Constitution); 𝑳𝑰𝑸𝒊,𝒕= (Current Assets/Current Liabilities); 
𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕= LN(Total Assets);  𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝒊,𝒕= (EBITDA/Total Assets); 𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯𝒊,𝒕= LN(Fixed Assets  𝒕) - (Fixed 
Assets 𝒕−𝟏) and 𝑽𝑶𝑳𝒊,𝒕= (Gross Margin/EBIT). The coefficients of the variables are significant at 1%(***), 
5%(***) and 10%(***) levels of significance. 
 
 
Model 14 DEBTR DEBTR LTDR LTDR STDR STDR 
C 
0.3387935  0. 3636506 0.7701712∗∗  0. 6690929∗ −0.4313777∗  −0. 3054423 
(0.3602376) (0.3751084) (0.3755968) (0.3879563) (0.2415254) (0.2466995) 
TANG 
0.3966398∗∗∗ 0.4257697∗∗∗ 0.3455489∗∗∗ 0.3728286∗∗∗ 0.051091 0.0529411 
(0.1271878) (0.1330003) (0.1326107) (0.1375557) (0.0852745) (0.087471) 
LAGE 
0.0972303∗ 0.0769429 0.1040128∗ 0.0928221 −0.0067824 −0.0158792 
(0.0511983) (0.0575761) (0.0533812) (0.0595482) (0.0343265) (0.0378664) 
LIQ 
0.0006712 0.0007873 0.0042005∗∗∗  0.0026029 −0.0035294∗∗∗ −0.0018156 
(0.0014625) (0.0017111) (0.0015249) (0.0017697) (0.0009806) (0.0011254) 
SIZE 
−0.0361878 −0.0330682 −0.1018463∗∗∗ −0.0857316∗∗∗ 0.0656585∗∗∗ 0.0526634∗∗ 
(0.0302268) (0.0313918) (0.0315155) (0.032467) (0.0202659) (0.0206456) 
GROWTH 
−0.0945902∗∗ −0.1009282∗ −0.0140672 −0.0687006 −0.080523∗∗∗ −0.0322275 
(0.0384759) (0.0555445) (0.0401163) (0.057447) (0.0257966) (0.0365302) 
VOL 
0.0000534 0.0001336 0.0000285 0.0000826 0.0000249 0.0000511 
(0.0000801) (0.0001251) (0.0000836) (0.0001293) (0.0000537) (0.0000822) 
CRISIS 
 0.1045413   0. 1934228  −0.0888815  
 (0.1188271)  (0.122897)  (0.0781496) 
TANG*CRISIS 
 −0.0340974  −0.0150636  −0.0190338 
 (0.0772518)  (0.0798977)  (0.0508066) 
LAGE*CRISIS 
 −0.0125546  −0.0271664  0.0146119 
 (0.0307478)  (0.0318009)  (0.0202221) 
LIQ*CRISIS 
 −0.000137  0.0054215∗  −0.0055585∗∗∗ 
 (0.0028812)  (0.0029799)  (0.0018949) 
SIZE*CRISIS 
 −0.0055843  −0.0146636   0.0090793 
 (0.0099015)  (0.0102407)  (0.006512) 
GROWTH*CRISI
S 
 0.0117514  0.0738617  −0.0621103 
 (0.0761028)  (0.0787094)  (0.0500509) 
VOL*CRISIS 
 −0.0001458  −0.0001087  −0.0000371 
 (0.0001655)  (0.0001711)  (0.0001088) 
N 681 681 681 681 681 681 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
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Table 14 - Estimations’ results including only firms with a profitability higher than the average. The 
standard deviations are within the parentheses. The variables are given by: 𝑫𝑬𝑩𝑻𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Total Debt/Total 
Assets); 𝑳𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = (Long-Term Debt/Total Assets); 𝑺𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Short-Term Debt/Total Assets); 𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊,𝒕 = 
(Fixed Assets/Total Assets); 𝑳𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊,𝒕 = LN(Year-Year of Constitution); 𝑳𝑰𝑸𝒊,𝒕 = (Current Assets/Current 
Liabilities); 𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕= LN(Total Assets);  𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝒊,𝒕= (EBITDA/Total Assets); 𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯𝒊,𝒕= LN(Fixed Assets 𝒕) - 
(Fixed Assets 𝒕−𝟏) and 𝑽𝑶𝑳𝒊,𝒕= (Gross Margin/EBIT). The coefficients of the variables are significant at 1%(***), 
5%(***) and 10%(***) levels of significance. 
 
Model 15 DEBTR DEBTR LTDR LTDR STDR STDR 
C 
−0. 0991581 −0.1207293∗∗  −0.0592968  −0.1029981  −0.0398613 −0.0177312  
(0.0579892) (0.0602718) (0.051714) (0.0537272) (0.0418629) (0.0430073) 
TANG 
0.2737445∗∗∗ 0.2684163∗∗∗ 0.3002585∗∗∗ 0.3141958∗∗∗ −0.0265141 −0.0457795 
(0.0422448) (0.0443699) (0.0376734) (0.039552) (0.0304969) (0.0316604) 
LAGE 
0.0169762 0.0153796 0.022893∗∗ 0.0229312∗∗ −0.0059168 −0.0075516 
(0.0108285) (0.0113659) (0.0096568) (0.0101317) (0.0078172) (0.0081102) 
LIQ 
0.0173406∗∗∗ 0.0186807∗∗∗ 0.0229219∗∗∗ 0.0307959∗∗∗ −0.0055813∗∗∗ −0.0121153∗∗∗ 
(0.0014374) (0.0028136) (0.0012818) (0.0025081) (0.0010376) (0.0020076) 
SIZE 
0.0254585 0.0276949∗∗∗ 0.0050417 0.0086441 0.0204168∗∗∗ 0.0190507∗∗∗ 
(0.0081227) (0.0084095) (0.0072437) (0.0074964) (0.0058639) (0.0060007) 
GROWTH 
−0.0130116 0.0125472 0.0093524 0.0178098 −0.022364∗∗∗ −0.0052626 
(0.0113125) (0.0130202) (0.0100883) (0.0116064) (0.0081666) (0.0092906) 
VOL 
−1.75𝑒 − 06 −0.0000155 −0.0000114 −0.00003 0.9.62𝑒 − 06 0.0000145 
(0.0000371) (0.0000521) (0.0000331) (0.0000464) (0.0000268) (0.0000372) 
CRISIS 
 −0.0029483   0. 0727329∗∗  −0.0756812∗∗  
 (0.0415891)  (0.0370732)  (0.0296761) 
TANG*CRISIS 
 0.0318178  −0.0310964  0.0629142∗ 
 (0.0498631)  (0.0444487)  (0.03558) 
LAGE*CRISIS 
 −0.0139246  0.0087866  −0.0227112∗∗ 
 (0.0124711)  (0.0111169)  (0.0088988) 
LIQ*CRISIS 
 −0.0016765  −0.0100343∗∗∗  0.0083578∗∗∗ 
 (0.003074)  (0.0027402)  (0.0021935) 
SIZE*CRISIS 
 0.006638  −0.0099029∗  0.0165409∗∗∗ 
 (0.0057868)  (0.0051584)  (0.0041292) 
GROWTH*CRISIS 
 −0.0851498∗∗∗  −0.0271459  −0.0580039∗∗∗ 
 (0.0243532)  (0.0217088)  (0.0173773) 
VOL*CRISIS 
 0.0000305  0.0000288  1.74𝑒 − 06 
 (0.0000727)  (0.0000648)  (0.0000519) 
N 1723 1723 1723 1723 1723 1723 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 15 - Estimations’ results including only firms with a profitability lower than the average. The 
standard deviations are within the parentheses. The variables are given by: 𝑫𝑬𝑩𝑻𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Total Debt/Total 
Assets); 𝑳𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = (Long-Term Debt/Total Assets); 𝑺𝑻𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕  = (Short-Term Debt/Total Assets); 𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑮𝒊,𝒕 = 
(Fixed Assets/Total Assets); 𝑳𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊,𝒕 = LN(Year-Year of Constitution); 𝑳𝑰𝑸𝒊,𝒕 = (Current Assets/Current 
Liabilities); 𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕= LN(Total Assets);  𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝒊,𝒕= (EBITDA/Total Assets); 𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯𝒊,𝒕= LN(Fixed Assets 𝒕) - 
(Fixed Assets 𝒕−𝟏) and 𝑽𝑶𝑳𝒊,𝒕= (Gross Margin/EBIT). The coefficients of the variables are significant at 1%(***), 
5%(***) and 10%(***) levels of significance. 
 
 
Model 16 DEBTR DEBTR LTDR LTDR STDR STDR 
C 
−0. 5067707 −0.4835756∗∗∗  −0.1987205∗∗  −0.2569989∗∗  −0.3080503∗∗∗ −0.2265767 
(0.0957152) (0.101712) (0.097065) (0.103093) (0.069183) (0.0725797) 
TANG 
0.2971982∗∗∗ 0.3151005∗∗∗ 0.3268548∗∗∗ 0.3310138∗∗∗ −0.0296565 −0.0159132 
(0.0572422) (0.0605702) (0.0580495) (0.0613926) (0.0413747) (0.0432217) 
LAGE 
0.1681544∗∗∗ 0.159295∗∗∗ 0.1515633∗∗∗ 0.1539557∗∗∗ 0.0165911 0.0053393 
(0.0168506) (0.0186722) (0.0170882) (0.0189257) (0.0121796) (0.0133241) 
LIQ 
0.002854∗∗∗ 0.0030452∗∗∗ 0.0074559∗∗∗ 0.0061231∗∗∗ −0.0046018∗∗∗ −0.0030778∗∗∗ 
(0.0008657) (0.0009114) (0.000878) (0.0009238) (0.0006258) (0.0006504) 
SIZE 
0.0293628∗∗∗ 0.0284647∗∗∗ −0.0130118 −0.0071457 0.0423746∗∗∗ 0.0356103∗∗∗ 
(0.0101912) (0.0106077) (0.0103349) (0.0107517) (0.0073662) (0.0075695) 
GROWTH 
−0.0812798∗∗∗ −0.0566613∗∗∗ −0.0323862∗∗ −0.0290923∗ −0.0488936∗∗∗ −0.0275691∗∗ 
(0.0145321) (0.0169451) (0.0147371) (0.0171752) (0.0105038) (0.0120917) 
VOL 
−0.0000746∗∗ −0.0000603 −0.0000412 −0.0000605 −0.0000334 2.65𝑒 − 07 
(0.0000381) (0.000049) (0.0000386) (0.0000496) (0.0000275) (0.0000349) 
CRISIS 
 −0.068392   −0.0504338   −0.0179583  
 (0.0530006)  (0.0537202)  (0.0378202) 
TANG*CRISIS 
 −0.0555432  −0.0044952  −0.0510479 
 (0.0444198)  (0.0450229)  (0.0316971) 
LAGE*CRISIS 
 0.0316178∗∗  0.0231317  0.0084861 
 (0.0144602)  (0.0146565)  (0.0103185) 
LIQ*CRISIS 
 −0.0004751  0.0096112∗∗∗  −0.0100863∗∗∗ 
 (0.0020587)  (0.0020867)  (0.0014691) 
SIZE*CRISIS 
 −0.0001261  −0.0047409  0.0046149 
 (0.0050053)  (0.0050732)  (0.0035717) 
GROWTH*CRISIS 
 −0.0606497∗∗  −0.0154221  −0.0452276∗∗ 
 (0.0305182)  (0.0309326)  (0.0217772) 
VOL*CRISIS 
 42𝑒 − 06  0.000038  −0.0000445 
 (0.0000765)  (0.0000775)  (0.0000546) 
N 2053 2053 2053 2053 2053 2053 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
